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Abstract
A new auditor reporting standard requires auditors to disclose critical audit matters
(CAMs) in the auditor’s report. CAMs highlight accounts or disclosures that involved especially
challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment. As one of few audit-related disclosures,
CAMs act as an important signal of qualitative aspects of recognized (i.e., items shown on the face
of the financial statements) or disclosed (i.e., items shown in the footnotes of the financial
statements) financial statement items. While certain accounts or disclosures will consistently rise
to the level of a CAM, other accounts or disclosures may only rise to the level of a CAM when
circumstances dictate. Therefore, different CAM disclosure patterns will emerge over time,
potentially changing investors’ information processing and investment-related judgments and
decisions. My study examines how two CAM disclosure characteristics—disclosure pattern and
reporting treatment of a CAM-related item—influence investors’ information processing, risk
perceptions, and investment decisions. Consistent with processing fluency, I find that a recurring
CAM disclosure pattern (i.e., same CAM reported over time) compared to a mixed CAM
disclosure pattern (i.e., a combination of recurring and transient CAMs reported over time) is
processed with greater fluency and leads to more favorable judgments of risk and higher
investment amounts. Additionally, investors perceive the highest (lowest) level of risk when a
mixed (recurring) CAM disclosure pattern is combined with a disclosed (recognized) item and
invest the least (most) amount of money. The results of this study contribute to accounting
literature, standard-setting, and practice by disentangling the signaling effects of CAM disclosures
over time.
vi

Chapter 1. Introduction
The PCAOB’s (2017) new auditor reporting standard requires auditors to disclose audit
areas involving especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment, known as critical
audit matters (hereafter: CAMs), or the absence thereof, in the auditor’s report. One of the
overarching objectives of this standard is to reduce information asymmetry and to improve the
informational value of the auditor’s report by “[facilitating investors’] analysis of financial
statements and other related disclosures” (PCAOB 2017, p. 67). Investor advocates have argued
that CAMs may help focus investor attention on key financial reporting issues (Fleming 2016).
Additionally, the PCAOB (2017) believes that investors’ assessment of financial statement
credibility, and in some instances audit quality, may be enhanced in the presence of CAMs. As
one of few audit-related disclosures, investors may perceive CAMs as a signal of meaningful
qualitative aspects of a company’s risk, financial reporting quality, and audit quality (Beck, Fuller,
Muriel, and Reid 2013).
As different CAM disclosure patterns emerge over time, investors’ judgments of quality,
risk, and investment behavior may be influenced. For instance, certain accounts or disclosures will
consistently rise to the level of a CAM (e.g., revenue) and require reporting year after year
(hereafter: recurring CAM). Other accounts or disclosures may only rise to the level of a CAM
when applicable (e.g., contingent tax liabilities) and thus require reporting on a transitory basis in
one year but not the next (hereafter: transient CAM). Accordingly, two distinct CAM disclosure
patterns will emerge over time: a recurring CAM disclosure pattern and a mixed CAM disclosure
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pattern. 1 Theory suggests that different CAM disclosure patterns will influence investors’
investment behavior due to differences in information processing (e.g., Bornstein and D’Agostino
1994; Zajonc 1968). For instance, recurring CAM disclosure patterns may be processed with
greater ease than mixed CAM disclosure patterns. CAMs are intended to draw investors’ attention
to accounts or disclosure that are material to the financial statements and involve especially
challenging, subjective, or complex judgments. CAMs are not intended to provide implicit signals
of risk. Regulatory guidance suggests that all CAMs should be interpreted with equal importance.
Nevertheless, investors may perceive CAM disclosure patterns as implicit signals of differing risk
when comparing CAMs over time. Consequently, examining the effect of CAM disclosure patterns
can provide insights into how investors access and process different CAM disclosure patterns and
how investment behavior is ultimately impacted.
Although CAMs are only reported for the current audit year, regulators anticipate that
investors will likely compare CAMs over time (PCAOB 2017). Furthermore, investor advocates
argue that changes in investor behavior resulting from CAM disclosures “will become more
evident after a period of years as comparative trends in CAMs are systematically captured by data
providers…” (Council of Institutional Investors 2020). Psychology-based literature suggests that
investors may experience processing fluency—the ease with which people perceive, encode, and
process information (Alter and Oppenheimer 2009)—when exposed to the same CAMs over time.
Prior studies show that heightened processing fluency leads to more favorable judgments toward
previously encountered stimuli (e.g., Alter and Oppenheimer 2009; Reber, Winkielman, and

1

A recurring CAM disclosure pattern is one where the same CAM is reported in sequential audit reports with little
or no change. A mixed CAM disclosure pattern is one where a combination of recurring and transient CAMs are
reported. While reporting only transient CAMs may be possible, a “fully transient” CAM disclosure pattern is highly
unlikely as CAM reporting is a costly process for auditors. Thus, I do not consider this type of CAM disclosure
pattern in my study.
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Schwarz 1998; Zajonc 1968). Thus, I expect investors to experience greater processing fluency
when exposed to a recurring CAM disclosure pattern than a mixed CAM disclosure pattern.
Consequently, investors will judge audit quality, financial reporting quality, and risk more
favorably when presented with a recurring CAM disclosure pattern, leading to higher investment.
Grounded in signaling theory (Spence 1973), which proposes that signals share private
information in informationally asymmetric environments, I argue that CAMs are salient signals of
underlying financial reporting quality and risks associated with accounts or disclosures contained
in the financial reporting environment (i.e., signaling environment). Signaling theory proposes that
the signaling environment is an integral part of the signaling process, which influences perceptions
of a signal by introducing noise (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, and Reutzel 2011; Lins and Sunyaev
2017). In the context of my study, the financial reporting environment serves as the platform
through which CAMs are reported. Therefore, I argue that the reporting treatment of a CAMrelated item is a complementary signal to a CAM disclosure which can influence investors’ overall
perceptions of quality and risk.
Whether an amount is reported on the face of the financial statements (i.e., recognized) or
in the related disclosures (i.e., disclosed) is an attribute of earnings presentation that influences the
ease with which information is processed (Libby and Emett 2014). Experimental and archival
studies suggest that individuals generally process recognized items with greater ease than disclosed
items. CAM disclosures, particularly recurring CAM disclosures, could further accentuate this
processing fluency by focusing investors’ attention to CAM-related areas only. Consistent with
this concern, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recognized that information
recurrence may affect information processing (SEC 2018). In recent discussions, the SEC has
warned that recurring disclosures may obfuscate other information and potentially influence
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investor decisions (SEC 2018, 2019, 2020). 2 Findings rooted in the consumer behavior literature
substantiate the concern that repeated disclosures, such as recurring CAM disclosures, may have
unintended consequences. For instance, Stewart and Martin (1994) suggest that individuals
experience desensitization to warnings after repeated exposure. Furthermore, this desensitization
may even cause individuals to react less strongly to other warnings (Main and Darke 2020).
My study seeks to address the following research questions: (1) Does CAM disclosure
pattern influence investment-related judgments and decisions? (2) Does the reporting treatment of
a CAM-related item differentially influence investment-related judgments and decisions under
different CAM disclosure patterns? Addressing these research questions is important for several
reasons. First, examining the effects of CAMs over time instead of a single point in time is
warranted since previously reported CAMs may serve as inputs to the total financial information
mix in subsequent years. Prior research has found that CAMs possess some attention-directing
properties (Sirois et al., 2016). However, it remains unclear whether investors experience
processing fluency in the context of CAMs. Second, an area that is particularly vulnerable to being
obfuscated by repeated disclosures is information presented in the footnotes of the financial
statements (i.e., disclosed items) as opposed to information presented on the face of the financial
statements (i.e., recognized items). By definition, CAMs can relate to either accounts or
disclosures that are material to the financial statements (PCAOB 2017). Therefore, it is particularly
fitting to examine whether CAMs can differentially influence investors’ judgments in the presence
of disclosed versus recognized items.

2

Although the SEC’s primary focus has been on disclosure repetition within a given annual report, the SEC also
acknowledges repeated information from disclosures made in the prior year as being a source of concern.
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To test my predictions, I conduct a 2 x 2 between-participants experiment 3 using a threeyear setting with 163 nonprofessional investors as participants. Nonprofessional investors
represent a significant market segment (Chen and Walton 2019; Mackintosh 2020; Tadesse and
Murthy 2018). Furthermore, investors’ use of mandated public disclosures has been of particular
concern to regulators (Christensen et al., 2014). First, participants read background information on
a fictional technology company. Participants then visited the company’s investor relations site,
which included three audit reports containing the CAM disclosure pattern manipulation (i.e.,
recurring or mixed CAM disclosure pattern) and comparative financial statements containing the
reporting treatment manipulation (i.e., recognized or disclosed tax-related issue). I used an online
behavioral analytics application to record participants’ mouse movements and site interactions as
they navigated through the investor relations site. 4 The use of a behavior analytics application is
crucial given my study’s focus on investors’ information processing. It provides a mechanism for
understanding the degree of attention investors direct to specific CAM disclosures. Upon
reviewing the audit reports and comparative financial statements, participants returned to the webbased questionnaire to answer questions related to their perceptions of risk, investment decisions,
and other investment-related judgments. Further, they answer questions related to their perceptions
of audit quality and financial reporting quality.
Consistent with the theoretical arguments of signaling theory and processing fluency, I find
that a recurring CAM disclosure pattern is processed more fluently, as evidenced by investors’

3

An experiment is well-suited for studying the effects of CAM recurrence because archival or survey studies can
confound information repetition with many other factors (Bonner 2008). Given the recency of the standard, not only
are CAM-related data scarce, but it is also difficult for archival studies to disentangle the effects of CAM
recurrence/transience from other events. Furthermore, the use of an experiment allows me to measure processing
fluency which is not directly observable in archival data (Rennekamp 2012).
4
Chen, Anderson, and Sohn (2001) find a strong relationship between gaze position and cursor position on a
computer screen during web browsing. Thus, for this particular study, a browser recording application is a wellsuited substitute to eye-tracking technology as a method of measuring cognitive processes such as attention and
information acquisition.
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steady decline in attention to the recurring CAM. Moreover, I find that investors perceive higher
(lower) risk and invest less (more) money when exposed to a mixed (recurring) CAM disclosure
pattern. However, CAM disclosure patterns do not impact investors’ perceptions of audit quality
or financial reporting quality. In supplemental path analysis, I find that CAM disclosure patterns
primarily influence investors’ investment decisions through risk perceptions, whereas reporting
treatment influences their investment decisions primarily through perceptions of credibility. In
other words, when reviewing a company's performance, investors negatively adjust their
investment decision according to the perceived level of risk. Although companies with a mixed
CAM disclosure pattern are perceived to be riskier, investors do not perceive the financial
information to be less credible, suggesting that signals coming from auditors do not influence
investors’ overall perceptions of credibility towards financial information. However, when a
company chooses to disclose an item instead of recognizing an item, investors’ perceptions of risk
are heightened because they perceive the financial information as less credible, suggesting that
investors scrutinize signals coming from management.
This study contributes to literature, standard-setting, and audit practice. From an
accounting literature perspective, the contribution of my study is two-fold. First, my study answers
a call for research related to investors’ processing of specific characteristics of CAM disclosures
(Hamilton and Winchel 2019). Few accounting studies have examined the effects of fluency
through repeated exposure (Bonner 2008; Hamilton and Winchel 2019). In fact, a lack of
systematic evidence exists on how disclosure repetition affects investors’ decision processes
(Brown, Gale, and Grant 2020). Thus, investigating the effects of CAM disclosure patterns on
investors’ information processing and investment-related judgments and decisions addresses
research scarcity in this area and provides a deeper understanding of how investors navigate and
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evaluate information. Although prior studies suggest that CAMs have some attention-directing
impact on investors (e.g., Sirois et al. 2018), prior research has not examined whether CAMs’
attention-directing impact sustains over time and whether investors experience processing fluency
in the context of CAMs. Therefore, my study extends the Sirois et al. (2018) research by
disentangling the signaling properties of CAMs over time while also considering complementary
signals, such as the reporting treatment of a CAM-related item. Second, my study utilizes a
behavior-analytics software that provides comprehensive feedback, through session recordings, on
users’ interactions with my experimental website. This innovative alternative to eye-tracking could
prove fruitful for other researchers interested in examining decision processes. From a standardsetting perspective, this study provides valuable insights related to the longer-term signaling effect
of CAM disclosures. Specifically, the results of this study can provide meaningful information to
consider in future post-implementation reviews. Additionally, given the similarities between the
CAM reporting requirement and the international Key Audit Matter (KAM) reporting requirement
(Vinson, Robertson, and Cockrell 2019), the results of my study can extend to international
standard-setting. Lastly, the results of my study can inform audit practice about the unintended
impact of CAM disclosure patterns on investors’ judgments and decisions.

7

Chapter 2. Background and Hypotheses
2.1 Regulatory Background
Standard-setters and regulators argue that disclosing CAMs in the auditor’s report is a way
to reduce stakeholders’ information asymmetry and ultimately enhance financial reporting quality
(PCAOB 2017). Moreover, standard setters believe that providing investors with additional
information regarding certain aspects of the audit will enhance users’ understanding of the audited
financial statements. According to the PCAOB (2017), CAMs will “add to the total mix of
information, providing insights relevant in analyzing and pricing risks in capital valuation and
allocation, and contributing to [investors’] ability to make investment decisions” (p. 3). Before the
new auditor’s reporting standard, investors relied on the audit report as an indicator of financial
reporting quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014). However, the former audit report format gave
financial statement users little insight into critical qualitative aspects of a company known to the
auditor but not publicly disclosed (Rapoport 2013).
One benefit of the new auditor reporting model is that it highlights important audit matters
and provides investors with potentially useful information to analyze a firm’s performance.
Investors who commented on the PCAOB’s new auditor reporting standard “overwhelmingly
agreed that the communication of [CAMs] would make the auditor’s report more informative”
(PCAOB 2017, p. 69). Conversely, other stakeholders expressed concerns that the CAM disclosure
requirement will not increase the informational value of the auditor’s report and that CAMs will
become boilerplate or repetitive (PCAOB 2017). This concern suggests that investors may
perceive CAMs as being “old news” and thus uninformative. Given the debate surrounding the
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informational value of CAMs, a richer understanding of CAMs’ signaling properties is warranted,
particularly as different CAM disclosure patterns emerge over time.
2.2 Attention Directing Effect of CAMs
The complexity and volume of financial statement disclosures can lead to cognitive
overload on financial statement users (e.g., Henry and Peytcheva 2020; Kelton and Pennington
2012). Financial statement users can deal with cognitive overload by using explicitly presented
information (Schipper 2007). Similarly, Sirois et al. (2018) argue that financial statement users
must be selective in their attention to information because of their limited information processing
capabilities, the increasing complexity of financial statements, and the overload of financial
disclosures. Prior literature establishes that individuals possess cognitive limitations, such as
limited attention and memory, and that people often experience difficulties with information search
and retrieval, particularly when presented with a large volume of information (e.g., Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Teoh 2002; Eppler and Mengis 2004).
Psychology-based research demonstrates that one possible way individuals cope with such
cognitive limitations is by developing short-cuts or heuristics to help with information processing
(Kahneman 1973, 2011; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Similarly, Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson
(2002) suggest that users often rely on heuristics to help them process the complex or excessive
nature of financial statement information. One such shortcut, often referred to as heuristic
processing, has been linked to source credibility as well as salience and availability. For instance,
Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) find evidence that individuals will place greater importance on
information from sources deemed more credible and will discount information from other sources
when presented with information from multiple sources. In the context of my study, I argue that
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CAMs are a credible source of information that can provide investors with greater insights
regarding financial statements.
From an accounting perspective, prior research suggests that the auditor’s report is a
credible and salient source of information available to its users. For example, Czerney, Schmidt,
and Thompson (2014) examine the relationship between explanatory language added to the audit
report and subsequently restated financial statements. They find a positive association between the
presence of explanatory language and subsequent financial statement restatements (Czerney et al.,
2014). These findings suggest that auditors play an important signaling role and that the audit
report communicates essential information about financial reporting quality (Czerney et al., 2014).
As the primary means by which auditors communicate with financial statement users, standard
setters expect investors to use the insights gathered from the enhanced auditor’s report to analyze
a company (PCAOB 2017). Given the volume of financial disclosures included within annual
reports, the PCAOB (2017) expects that CAMs will “focus investors' attention on key financial
reporting issues and identify areas that deserve more attention” (p. 76). Consistent with the
PCAOB’s expectation, extant research suggests that CAMs possess both an attention-directing
effect and enhanced informational value (e.g., Christensen et al. 2014; Sirois et al. 2016) because
auditor assurance increases financial information credibility (Mercer 2004).
From a source credibility perspective, Mercer (2004) suggests that the audit opinion is one
cue that investors use to assess financial disclosures and management credibility. In a slightly
different context, Kelton and Montague (2018) investigate the influence of emphasis-of-matter
paragraphs on investors’ judgments and decisions. They find that investors use the information
provided in emphasis-of-matter paragraphs to assess management credibility and inform their
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investment decisions. These findings suggest that investors trust and incorporate auditor-provided
information to assess a company’s financial reports (Kelton and Montague 2018).
From an attention-directing perspective, Sirois et al. (2018) use eye-tracking technology to
examine the single-year effects of KAMs, the European equivalent of CAMs, on users’ attention
to both the KAM disclosure and KAM-related disclosures. Consistent with the notion that CAMs
have an attention-directing effect, Sirois et al. (2018) find evidence that financial statement users
pay more attention to KAM-related disclosures than non-KAM-related disclosures when the
auditor’s report communicates a KAM. However, the attention-directing effect diminishes as the
number of KAMs increases. I build upon this research by disentangling the signaling effects of
CAMs and examining how different CAM disclosure patterns, such as recurring versus mixed
disclosure patterns, influence information processing and investing behavior. Furthermore,
Christensen et al. (2014) find that the expanded auditor’s report, compared to the standard auditor
report (without CAMs) or the same information provided via management’s footnotes only,
influences investors’ decisions. This finding supports the idea that CAMs are a useful signaling
tool and suggests that CAMs possess a source credibility effect.
2.3 Signaling Theory and CAMs
Signaling theory describes the behavior when two parties have access to different
information and involves three major elements: a signaler, a signal, and a receiver (Connelly et al.,
2011; Spence 1973). Typically, one party (i.e., a signaler) possesses private information about an
individual, product, or organization that is not available to another party (i.e., a receiver) who
would like to receive it. This private information gives the signaler a privileged perspective
regarding the underlying quality of the individual, product, or organization in question (Connelly
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et al. 2011). Therefore, signals share private information with receivers, who must then choose
how to interpret the signal.
Given the information asymmetry between investors and auditors, I argue that CAMs are
one mechanism auditors can use to communicate private information with investors. Consistent
with prior research (e.g., Christensen et al. 2014; Czerney et al. 2014; Sirois et al. 2018) as well as
standard-setters (PCAOB 2017), I argue that CAMs are salient cues that highlight accounts or
disclosures with heightened complexity and subjectivity which investors may perceive as having
heightened financial misstatement risk despite an unqualified audit opinion. Specifically, I argue
that CAMs (i.e., signals) are a way to convey risk to investors (i.e., receivers), given that auditors
(i.e., signalers) have information that investors do not.
As assurance providers, auditors’ choice to report then subsequently remove a CAM can
implicitly signal information about the financial statements. For instance, Vinson et al. (2019) state
that “CAM removal is much stronger than simply not reporting a CAM because it signals to users
that the issue involved is no longer of sufficient complexity, subjectivity, or difficulty to rise to the
level of a CAM” (p. 187). Conversely, repeating a previously reported CAM may signal to
financial statement users that the auditor considers the account or disclosure an ongoing material,
subjective, and complex area to audit (Vinson et al., 2019). Similarly, Beatty et al. (2019) argue
that repeated disclosures implicitly signal continuing risks. In contrast, new or discontinued
disclosures implicitly signal financial statement users regarding emerging or intermittent risks,
respectively (Beatty et al. 2019). Therefore, investors may perceive discontinued CAM disclosures
(i.e., transient CAMs) as a signal of reduced investment risk.
Consequently, auditors may err on the side of caution and keep CAMs consistent over time
and across firms within the same industry. However, not all accounts or disclosures are conducive
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to being reported on a recurring basis. 5 Thus, I expect that CAM disclosure patterns will
differentially influence investors’ perceptions of risk, and consequently, investment decisions.
2.4 The Role of Repeated Exposure on Fluency
Prior research suggests that some stimuli are more easily processed than others (Lim and
Teoh 2010). Processing fluency refers to the ease with which information is perceived, encoded,
and processed (Alter and Oppenheimer 2009). Psychology-based research suggests that more
fluently processed stimuli lead to more positive evaluations of the stimuli, and this effect has been
replicated in various settings. For instance, studies have found that more fluently processed stimuli
are generally rated as more favorable than less fluent stimuli (see Alter and Oppenheimer 2009 for
a review). One way to induce processing fluency is through repeated exposure (Bornstein and
D’Agostino 1994; Jacoby and Dallas 1981) because individuals automatically encode frequency
information (Zacks, Hasher, and Saft 1982). As individuals experience higher processing fluency,
a preference for previously-encountered stimuli develops because the stimuli are more accessible
to memory (Zajonc 1968, 2001). Processing fluency serves as the basis for the feeling of familiarity
(Johnston, Dark, and Jacoby 1985; Schwarz 2004), which generally induces more positive
evaluations of the previously-encountered stimulus (Chen and Tan 2013). This phenomenon,
known as the mere exposure effect, has been studied using various stimuli, and its effect has been
observed even when stimuli could not be recalled or recognized at better-than-chance accuracy
(Bornstein and D’Agostino 1994).
A few studies have examined familiarity-induced fluency and its effect on investor
judgments and decisions. For example, Chen and Tan (2013) argue that investors’ familiarity with

5

Some accounts or disclosures might not be conducive to CAM repetition. For example, a contingent liability could
be disclosed as a CAM in one year but subsequently removed if the matter related to the contingent liability is resolved.
Similarly, a CAM related to goodwill may no longer necessitate a CAM disclosure if goodwill is fully impaired.
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an analyst’s name influences investors’ perceptions of analyst credibility. Specifically, the authors
point out that prior exposure to an analyst’s name leads to enhanced processing fluency, increasing
investors’ feelings of familiarity with the name and leading to more favorable judgments of the
analyst. Consistent with processing fluency, Chen and Tan (2013) find that investors implicitly
equate prior exposure to an analyst’s name with greater familiarity leading to increased perceptions
of analyst performance, credibility, and greater reliance on more familiar analysts. Alter and
Oppenheimer (2006) investigate the impact of fluency on stock fluctuations and find that stocks
with more fluent names (i.e., fictional stock names that are easy to pronounce) outperform stocks
with disfluent names (i.e., fictional stock names that are hard to pronounce). Archivally, studies
have shown that investors prefer familiar investments to unfamiliar ones (Hamilton and Winchel
2019). For instance, Bonner, Hugon, and Walther (2007) use analysts’ celebrity status as a proxy
for familiarity and examine investors’ reaction to earnings forecast revisions when the analyst’s
name is more familiar. They find that investors exhibit stronger reactions to forecast revisions from
more familiar analysts. Similarly, Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) find that firms with higher
visibility (i.e., higher familiarity) benefit from a larger number of investors and better liquidity.
Huberman (2001) also provides evidence that investors prefer what is more familiar even when
doing so is not the most optimal decision.
In the context of CAMs, some CAMs will likely recur (i.e., repeat) across consecutive audit
reports, while others may only appear on a transitory basis. The new auditor reporting standard
does not prohibit or specify guidelines discouraging the repetition of CAMs over time. Anecdotal
evidence from the U.K. suggests that some CAMs will be repeated over time while others will be
reported then removed. Prior literature suggests that auditors have incentives to report and repeat
CAMs over time, as opposed to not reporting a CAM at all or removing a CAM once reported as
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the latter could increase perceived auditor liability (e.g., Backof, Bowlin, and Goodson 2019;
Brasel, Doxey, Grenier, and Reffett 2016; Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski 2016; Vinson et al.
2019). Due to increased processing fluency, recurring CAM disclosure patterns will be
instinctively perceived as more familiar and induce greater fluency, thus generate more favorable
judgments.
Consequently, I expect investors to rate risk more favorably when exposed to a recurring
CAM disclosure pattern than when exposed to a mixed CAM disclosure pattern. Given more
favorable judgments of risk, I also expect investors to invest more when exposed to a recurring
CAM disclosure pattern than a mixed CAM disclosure pattern. Formally stated, I hypothesize the
following:
H1a: Investors’ perceptions of risk will be lower (higher) when exposed to a recurring
(mixed) CAM disclosure pattern.
H1b: Investors’ investment decision will be larger (smaller) when exposed to a recurring
(mixed) CAM disclosure pattern.
2.5 The Role of Signaling Environment
Recent literature reveals that the signaling environment also influences signal effectiveness
and can impact a signal receiver’s perceptions of the signal (Lins and Sunyaev 2017). A
complementary signal to CAM disclosures is the reporting treatment of CAM-related items. The
PCAOB’s new auditor reporting standard does not preclude auditors from reporting CAMs that
involve disclosed or recognized items. By definition, CAMs can relate to either accounts or
disclosures that are material to the financial statements (PCAOB 2017). To assess whether CAMs
have been issued for both recognized and disclosed items, I examine the annual filings for one
hundred Fortune 500 companies and find evidence that the reporting treatment for certain CAMs
varies by company (see Appendix A). To summarize, the annual filings comprised a total of 188
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CAMs, approximately 49% of the CAMs related to a specific issue recognized on the face of the
financial statements and 14% related to a disclosed issue. The data reveals that in some cases,
companies opt to disclose amounts related to certain contingency liabilities, tax positions, and
goodwill impairment, while other companies opt to recognize amounts related to the same type of
issues. This evidence suggests that CAMs are reported for the same type of account or disclosure
for which companies have either recognized or disclosed the CAM-related issue. Given this
preliminary evidence, examining how investors’ information processing changes due to the
CAMs’ association to a recognized versus a disclosed item is particularly fitting.
Prior research suggests that a primary attribute of earnings presentation is location (i.e.,
whether an amount is reported on a financial statement or in the related disclosures) because it can
influence the ease with which information is processed (Libby and Emett 2014). Specifically, both
experimental and archival evidence suggest that financial statement users process disclosed items
differently than recognized items. There is overwhelming evidence suggesting that financial
statement users either do not attend to disclosed items or attend to disclosed items to a lesser extent
than recognized items. One reason to help explain why financial statement users react differently
to an item’s reported location is that location can serve as a cue about its usefulness (Schipper
2007). For instance, Davis-Friday, Liu, and Mittelstaedt (2004) archivally examine the relationship
between location and perceptions of reliability and find market participants have a stronger
reaction to recognized non-pension post-retirement benefits under SFAS No. 106 than when they
were disclosed under SFAS No.74. In the context of derivative financial instruments, Ahmed,
Kilic, and Lobo (2006) also find that investors value recognized information more than disclosed
information.
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From an experimental perspective, Hirst and Hopkins (1998) and Maines and McDaniel
(2000) provide empirical evidence that information location can influence users' judgments. For
example, Hirst and Hopkins (1998) examine whether more transparent reporting of comprehensive
income facilitates analysts’ detection of earnings management. They find that analysts detect
earnings management related to investments only when unrealized gains/losses are presented in a
statement of comprehensive income instead of not being explicitly reported or being reported on
the statement of changes in equity (Hirst and Hopkins 1998). Similarly, Maines and McDaniel
(2000) find that nonprofessional investors’ performance judgments differ depending on where the
comprehensive income is presented. Specifically, the authors conclude that the effect of alternative
presentation formats on nonprofessional investors’ performance judgments results from changes
in their information weighting (Maines and McDaniel 2000). In other words, investors weigh
information differently depending on where the information is presented. Since CAMs have a
signaling effect, CAM-related areas may be perceived as more important or weighted more heavily
when related to a recognized item than a disclosed item. Collectively, these findings suggest that
recognized items are processed more fluently than disclosed items.
Another reason investors might react differently to recognized versus disclosed items is
attributable to the intrinsic characteristics of the users themselves (Schipper 2007). Specifically,
Schipper (2007) suggests that less sophisticated financial statement users may lack the ability or
motivation to process disclosed items thoroughly and that they tend to use explicitly presented
information. Similarly, Dietrich, Kleinmuntz, and Linsmeier (2001) suggest that one reason why
financial statement users attend to explicitly presented matters, such as recognized items, is
because they tend to avoid cognitive effort associated with processing disclosed information.
Interestingly, this phenomenon appears to be particularly more prominent among less sophisticated
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financial statement users. For example, Dearman and Shields (2005) find that students with high
motivation, problem-solving abilities, and subject matter knowledge adjusted for disclosed items.
In contrast, students without those characteristics failed to do so (Dearman and Shields 2005).
These studies suggest that CAMs could be an effective attention-directing mechanism for less
sophisticated investors to integrate disclosed information into their decision-making.
Overall, the accounting literature has well established the effects of reporting treatment on
investors’ investment-related judgments and decisions. Therefore, I do not present hypotheses for
the main effect of reporting treatment. However, since CAMs are a credible signal and possess
some attention-directing properties, CAMs may intensify reporting treatment effects. In other
words, I posit that financial statement users will use a CAM’s association to either a recognized or
disclosed item as a cue which will change the ease with which they process information. To guide
my predictions on the effects of reporting treatment while accounting for any CAM disclosure
pattern effects, I rely on both the findings from prior research and processing fluency. I predict a
contrast interaction such that the effect of reporting treatment (i.e., recognized versus disclosed)
on investors’ perceptions of risk will be lowest when processing a recurring CAM disclosure
pattern with a recognized item and highest when processing a mixed CAM disclosure pattern with
a disclosed item. Consequently, I expect investors to invest the most when processing a recurring
CAM disclosure pattern with a recognized item and the least when processing a mixed CAM
disclosure pattern with a disclosed item. Formally, I present the following contrast hypotheses for
interaction effects on investment-related judgments and decisions:
H2a: Investors’ perceptions of risk will be lowest (highest) when processing a recurring
CAM disclosure pattern and a recognized item (mixed CAM disclosure pattern and a
disclosed item).
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H2b: Investors’ investment decision will be highest (lowest) when processing a recurring
CAM disclosure pattern and a recognized item (mixed CAM disclosure pattern and a
disclosed item).
Finally, I explore whether CAM disclosure patterns can influence investors’ perceptions of
audit quality and financial reporting quality and whether these perceptions vary depending on
reporting treatment. To the extent that CAMs signal underlying risk, investors may simultaneously
form impressions of audit quality and financial reporting quality. Gaynor, Kelton, Mercer, and
Yohn (2016) suggest that financial reporting quality and audit quality are often inseparable from
observable financial reporting outcomes. As previously discussed, processing fluency suggests
that investors’ perceptions of quality would be more favorable given a recurring CAM disclosure
pattern as opposed to a mixed CAM disclosure pattern because the former can be processed more
fluently. Similarly, both processing fluency and prior research suggest that investors process
recognized items more fluently than disclosed items. However, the PCAOB expects that the
presence of CAMs will not influence perceptions of either audit or financial reporting quality
(PCAOB 2017). Since CAMs are intended to convey elements of heightened risk, CAM disclosure
patterns should not change investors’ perceptions of either audit quality or financial reporting
quality, as CAMs are not intended to be perceived as a qualification or substitution of the auditor’s
opinion. Therefore, I present the following research question:
RQ1: Do CAM disclosure patterns significantly influence nonprofessional investors’
perceptions of audit quality and financial reporting quality?
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Chapter 3. Research Method
3.1 Participants
To test my hypotheses, I conduct an online experiment using 163 nonprofessional investors
recruited from Prolific. 6 Following suggestions to avoid using more sophisticated participants than
is necessary (e.g., Libby et al. 2002; Peecher and Solomon 2001), Prolific participants serve as
appropriate participants since my study focuses on nonprofessional investors’ general information
processing abilities, judgments, and decision-making. My focus on nonprofessional investors is
appropriate since prior research finds that less sophisticated investors, but not sophisticated
investors, are influenced by disclosure characteristics, such as readability (e.g., Rennekamp 2012)
and year-over-year repetition (e.g., Brown and Tucker 2011). Furthermore, nonprofessional
investors have direct ownership of about 35 percent of the equity market, representing a significant
and active market-participant group (Siewert 2021).
To ensure experimental control in obtaining participants from a crowdsourcing platform, I
follow the best practices outlined by Hunt and Scheetz (2018). First, I use commonly adopted
demographic screening filters to ensure that I collect data from qualified participants (Buchheit,
Doxey, Pollard, and Stinson 2018). Consistent with prior studies utilizing crowdsourcing platforms
(e.g., Kelton and Murthy 2016; Rennekamp 2012), my study was only made available to
participants who (1) are 18 years of age or older, (2) reside in the United States, (3) are fluent

6

Prolific is a newer crowdsourcing platform designed for conducting research. Palan and Schitter (2018) report that
Prolific has been successfully used in areas like economics and psychology. A key advantage to using Prolific is that
researchers can pre-screen participants based on a pool of pre-screening questions used in other studies for which
answers are elicited independently of specific studies (Palan and Schitter 2018).
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English speakers, (4) have an approval rate greater than or equal to 95, and (5) indicated having
invested in the common stock or shares of a company. Second, I set up Qualtrics to automatically
capture participants’ Prolific ID, allowing me to identify anyone who attempted to complete my
study more than once. Lastly, I validated responses by providing participants with a unique code
to enter upon completion. Participants were compensated $6.00 for completing my study. On
average, participants took approximately 26.50 minutes to complete my study, equating to an
hourly rate of $13.59.
Of the participants, 65 percent were male, and 35 percent were female. The average age
was 35.13. On average, participants indicated having moderate experience and knowledge
investing in individual stocks (mean = 4.75) and analyzing financial statements (mean = 4.20) and
had taken at least 1.59 and 1.25 accounting and finance courses, respectively. Overall, 79.2 percent
of participants possessed at least an associate degree. Nearly 78 percent indicated being selfemployed or having at least part-time employment. Table 1 presents participants’ demographics
by experimental condition. Sample statistics show no significant difference in participant
demographics across the experimental conditions, indicating that random assignment to the
experimental conditions was effective. 7
3.2 Design and Experimental Procedures
I conduct a 2 x 2 between-participants experiment to test my predictions, with CAM
disclosure pattern and reporting treatment as manipulated independent variables using a threeyear setting (see Appendix B). The first factor—CAM disclosure pattern—is manipulated at two

7
A Chi-Square test on gender distribution shows no significant differences across experimental conditions (χ2 =
2.44; df = 3; p = 0.49). A one-way ANOVA shows no significant differences across experimental conditions for the
following participant attributes: investment experience (F = 0.71; p = 0.55), financial statement analysis experience
(F = 0.26; p = 0.86), age (F = 0.32; p = 0.81), education (F = 1.68; p = 0.17), number of accounting courses taken (F
= 0.10; p = 0.96), number of finance courses taken (F = 0.19; p = 0.90), and employment status (F = 0.39; p = 0.76).
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levels: recurring CAM disclosure pattern or mixed CAM disclosure pattern. 8 The second factor—
reporting treatment—relates to recognizing or disclosing a tax-related financial statement item. To
gain a more holistic understanding of CAM disclosure patterns' effects, I include a fifth
experimental condition (i.e., control condition) which serves as a baseline measure of investors’
perceptions in the absence of any CAMs. 9 This condition provides an understanding of the extent
to which each CAM disclosure pattern individually influences investors’ judgments and decisions.
Upon qualifying to participate in the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to
one of the four experimental conditions: (A) recurring CAM disclosure pattern/recognized tax
issue, (B) mixed CAM disclosure pattern/recognized tax issue, (C) recurring CAM disclosure
pattern/disclosed tax issue, and (D) mixed CAM disclosure pattern/disclosed tax issue. Participants
in all conditions first read some general instructions and were then informed of their task
requirements. Specifically, participants were asked to assume the role of a current investor for a
hypothetical publicly traded company, FHC Corporation. They were told to carefully read the last
three audit reports and analyze the latest comparative financial statements. Participants were told
they would be asked to make some investment-related decisions before being redirected to Prolific
upon completing their review. To ensure that participants were attentive to the instructions, I
included two questions as attention checks. The first attention check question required participants
to indicate whether the following statement was true or false: “I will be redirected to Prolific upon
submitting my completed survey.” The second attention check question asked participants to

8

I define a recurring CAM disclosure pattern as one where the same CAM recurs in sequential audit reports with no
change in the CAM language. I define a mixed CAM disclosure pattern as one where both recurring and transitory
CAMs (i.e., CAMs that do not recur and that have neither been previously reported nor will not continue to be
reported as a CAM in subsequent years) coexist.
9
I describe this condition in greater detail under the “Additional Analyses” section.
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indicate how many audit reports they would have to review. The answer to both of these attention
check questions was explicitly stated in the instructions.
Next, participants received summary and background information about the company,
including information about the company’s audit firm complying with a new standard that requires
auditors to report CAMs. In addition to being provided with a description of what a CAM is,
participants received examples of accounts or disclosures typically considered especially
challenging, subjective, or complex. Further, participants were instructed that a company could
choose to record or disclose but not record an economic event given certain parameters in some
instances. This was followed by a brief explanation of the main difference between a recognized
and disclosed item (i.e., one reflected on the face of the financial statements and the other reflected
in the notes to the financial statements).
On the next screen, participants were given a link to an external website referred to as
“FHC Corporation’s investor relations site.” Upon landing on the investor relations site, a behavior
analytics application (i.e., Hotjar) 10 was triggered and began recording participants’ sessions
through the site. Participants saw three sequential audit reports, comparative financial statements,
and the related notes to the financial statements within the investor relations site. The sequential
audit reports included the CAM disclosure pattern manipulation (i.e., recurring or mixed CAM
disclosure). All participants first landed on the 2017 audit report, then proceeded to the 2018 audit
report before going to the 2019 audit report, and ended with the comparative financial statements
and notes to the financial statements. This linear format ensured that all participants looked at the
audit reports before accessing the related financial information and notes to the financial

10

“Hotjar is a behavior analytics and user feedback service that helps you understand the behavior of your website
users and get their feedback through tools such as heatmaps, session recordings, and surveys” Hotjar (2020).
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statements. Each note to the financial statements was expandable/collapsible and required the
participant to “drill down” on the note.
Participants were exposed to the same revenue-related CAM in the recurring CAM
disclosure pattern condition across each audit report. Conversely, participants saw the same
revenue-related CAM across each audit report and saw an additional CAM in year 2 in the mixed
CAM disclosure pattern condition. The second CAM (i.e., transient CAM) shown in the mixed
CAM pattern condition was a tax-related CAM that was only reported in year 2 but not in years 1
or 3. This intentional design choice to include a transient CAM disclosure in the second audit
report (i.e., year 2) made it clear that the transitory CAM was neither previously reported nor
continued to be reported. This design choice promotes the internal validity of the mixed CAM
disclosure pattern condition by increasing the salience of the transitory nature of one CAM
compared to the recurring CAM. Thus, to the extent that investors attend to the transient CAM in
the mixed CAM condition, the transient CAM would either direct investors’ attention to a
recognized or disclosed tax issue. A final page where the company’s comparative financial
statements and notes to the financial statements included the reporting treatment manipulation
followed the audit reports. 11
The reporting treatment manipulation involved a tax issue that had either been recognized
or disclosed by the company. In the Recognized condition, the amount was reflected on the face of
the financial statements and was also explicitly described within the notes to the financial
statements as being recognized. Conversely, in the Disclosed condition, the amount was not
reflected on the face of the financial statement. However, it was explicitly described within the

11

Consistent with prior research (e.g., Sirois et al. 2018), participants were presented a rich and realistic set of audit
reports and financial information which is more representative of investors’ actual information environment
(PCAOB 2016, p.72).

24

notes to the financial statements as being disclosed. This manipulation was intentionally designed
in this manner to allow a better understanding of the information processing differences, as well
as judgment and decision-making differences, between recognized and disclosed items when a
CAM related to the disclosed or recognized item is present (e.g., mixed CAM disclosure pattern
condition) or absent (i.e., recurring CAM disclosure pattern condition). 12 This manipulation also
enables me to disentangle the effects of a CAM from any effect resulting from an economic event's
salience on the face of the financial statements. On the last page, participants were instructed to
close the investor relations site and return to Qualtrics upon completing the financial information
review.
Upon returning to Qualtrics, participants were asked to acknowledge that they had closed
the investor relations site13 and were asked to answer questions related to my study’s dependent
variables. Specifically, I captured participants’ risk perceptions and perceptions of audit and
financial reporting quality (RQ1) using 11-point Likert scales adapted from Beck et al. (2013).
Then, participants made an investment decision by indicating the amount they would invest in the
company if they had $10,000 to invest in the industry within which FHC Corporation operates,
similar to the approach in Kelton and Murthy (2016). Participants subsequently responded to the
manipulation check questions before answering post-experimental questions, which included an
open-ended question asking participants to describe as much as possible about the CAMs that were
reported in the three auditor’s reports. Participants concluded the experiment by answering
personal background questions. The experimental instrument is included in Appendix C.

12

My choice to manipulate the recognition versus disclosure of a tax-related issue is appropriate given that
accounting standards provide companies with significant discretion leading to divergent reporting of the same tax
issue even within the same audit firm (e.g., De Simone et al. 2014; Drake, Goldman, Lusch, and Schmidt 2020).
Thus, this setting provides an ideal condition to test differences between disclosed versus recognized tax issues in
the presence or absence of a related CAM.
13
Participants were given an error if they indicated that they had not closed the investor relations site and were not
allowed to proceed until they acknowledged that they closed the site.
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Table 1
Participants’ Demographics by Experimental Condition
Frequency or Mean (Standard Deviation)

Recurring
x
Recognized
n = 40

Mixed
x
Recognized
n = 46

Recurring
x
Disclosed
n = 43

Mixed
x
Disclosed
n = 34

16
24

12
34

17
26

12
22

34.10 (12.13)

36.36 (11.72)

34.42 (12.30)

35.46 (9.96)

2
6
5
16
10
1

2
6
1
21
13
3

4
7
3
25
3
1

1
6
3
11
12
1

3
3
2
1
30
1

4
5
1
2
33
1

3
5
4
3
25
3

4
2
4
5
17
2

4.25 (2.90)

5.09 (3.05)

4.70 (2.54)

4.97 (2.74)

3.90 (2.83)

4.20 (2.86)

4.40 (2.69)

4.32 (2.45)

# Acct Courses

1.60 (2.47)

1.57 (2.92)

1.77 (3.79)

1.38 (2.89)

# Fin Courses

1.38 (1.98)

1.22 (1.75)

1.07 (1.49)

1.35 (2.92)

Gender:
Female
Male
Age
Education:
High School or
Equivalent
Some college
Associate’s
Bachelor’s
Master’s
Terminal degree
Employment
status:
Unemployed
Student
Self-Employed
Part-time
Full-time
Retired
Invest
Experience
Fin. Stmts.
Evaluation
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3.3 Dependent Variables
Beck et al. (2013) suggest that qualitative aspects of an audit engagement, typically
difficult for investors to observe, can ultimately influence risk perceptions, financial reporting
quality perceptions, and audit quality perceptions. Since CAMs are one of few audit-related
disclosures, CAMs may serve as important signals of underlying risk, consequently influencing
investment-related judgments and decisions. In some instances, CAMs may potentially be
perceived as a signal of financial reporting and audit quality. Thus, I collect measures for
perceptions of risk, investment decisions, and perceived quality.
I draw on prior research for my dependent variable measures (e.g., Beck et al. 2013; Kelton
and Murthy 2016). I measure (1) Perceived Risk, (2) Investment Decision, (3) Perceived Audit
Quality, and (4) Perceived Financial Reporting Quality. For items (1), (3), and (4), I asked
participants to indicate their level of agreement with each of the following statements: “An
investment in FHC Corporation is a risky investment,” “The audit of FHC Corporation was
performed thoroughly,” “FHC Corporation’s financial information did not contain errors.” I
captured each answer on an 11-point Likert scale, anchored at “0 – strongly disagree” to “10 –
strongly agree”. Lastly, for item (2), I measured participants’ Investment Decision by asking
participants to indicate how much they would invest in FHC Corporation if they had $10,000 to
invest in the industry within which FHC Corporation operates.
3.4 Other Measured Variables
Information Processing. To gain further insights into my theoretical assumptions and
potential mediating effects, I capture participants’ information processing using Hotjar. This webrecording application lets me view participants’ navigation and interactions through the investor
relations site. Hotjar is a behavior analytics software that gives website owners comprehensive
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feedback on users’ site interactions through session recordings. Prior research finds a strong
relationship between gaze position and cursor position on a computer screen during web browsing
(Chen et al. 2001). Thus, I use the software to capture participants’ information processing as the
time spent on specific CAM sections.
Attitude towards Information. Given that theory suggests that the repetition of a stimulus
(e.g., signal) often links to more positive attitudes towards the stimulus resulting from a sense of
increased familiarity with the stimulus, I also capture participants’ attitudes toward the audit report.
Specifically, I use a 7-point semantic differential scale anchored by descriptions of the audit report
and their negation. The descriptors, adapted from Pope, Voges, and Brown (2004), are as follows:
good, interesting, informative, appropriate, easy to understand, and objective.
Source credibility. Prior research argues that signals from more credible sources are more
effective than signals from less credible sources. Given my theoretical argument that CAMs are a
credible signal, I gauge the perception of source credibility between the auditor-provided
information and management-provided information. I adapt measures from Cohen, Gaynor,
Krishnamoorthy, Wright (2020) and ask participants to assess the credibility of the audit reports
and the financial report. These measures were collected using 11-point Likert scale questions,
whereby the endpoints were labeled “0 – No credibility” and “10 – High credibility”.
Information Weighting. Prior research suggests that the presentation, location, and source
of information may influence the weight (or importance) associated with the said item. Consistent
with prior literature, I ask participants to weigh the following items based on their importance
when evaluating the company: financial statements, notes to the financial statement, and
independent auditor’s report (Kelton and Montague 2018).
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Perceptions of CAM recurrence. To the extent that perceptions of risk differ across CAM
disclosure patterns, I also ask participants to indicate the likelihood that revenue and tax-related
critical audit matters will be reported in the audit report in the future. I measure this question on
an 11-point Likert scale ranging from “0 – Not at all likely” to “10 – Extremely likely”.
3.5 Pilot Study
Participants in my pilot study were 100 nonprofessional investors recruited from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) online labor market. 14 M-Turk provides a relatively reliable source of
participants best suited for obtaining individuals such as nonprofessional investors (Hunt and
Scheetz 2019; Rennekamp 2012). Following the best practices outlined by Hunt and Scheetz
(2019) to ensure proper experimental control, I used the M-Turk sandbox environment, a simulated
environment that allows testing of tasks and applications, before publishing the live experiment,
validated responses by providing each participant with a unique survey code to enter in the MTurk platform upon completion, and asked two pre-experiment screening questions to ensure that
only qualified participants were allowed to participate in my study. In addition to the preexperiment screening questions and survey viewing restrictions, I also restricted recruitment to MTurk workers 18 years of age, who reside in the United States, and have a HIT approval rate of 90
or higher. 15 I paid each participant a base pay of $2.00 and was eligible to earn an additional $2.50
by answering 100 percent of the review questions correctly. 16 On average, participants took 27
minutes and 39 seconds to complete the experiment, which means that participant compensation
was equivalent to an hourly pay rate of $9.76 for those receiving the bonus and $4.34 for those not

14

IRB approval was obtained prior to launching this study.
Human Intelligence Task (HIT) Approval Rate represents a rating of the proportions of tasks approved for a
worker relative to the number of completed tasks.
16
M-Turkers were informed at the beginning of the case that they would be presented with the following three types
of questions: review questions, case questions, and background questions. Participants were informed that had to
correctly answer 100 percent of the review questions to be compensated. This aligns with what has been done in
prior studies (e.g., Vinson et al. 2019) which helps ensure that participants pay attention to the case materials.
15
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receiving the bonus. The pilot study used a 2 x 1 between-participants design with CAM disclosure
pattern as the manipulated independent variable, and reporting treatment held constant across the
two conditions in a three-year setting. I included a third condition to understand the incremental
effect of CAMs better. In the third condition, participants saw the mixed CAM disclosure
pattern/disclosed tax-related item condition.
Of the 100 initial responses in my pilot test, 11 participants failed at least one of the
attention check questions, 51 participants failed either one or both manipulation check questions,
and 26 participants either failed to provide a valid worker ID that could be matched to a Hotjar
session recording or had a recording shorter than 10 seconds. In summary, the results of my pilot
study were mostly inconclusive as my final sample comprised only 12 usable responses. Thus, I
failed to find a significant main effect for CAM disclosure pattern. However, I found partial
support for my theoretical assumptions regarding attention. Specifically, I found a significant
effect for Attention by audit report year across conditions. To gauge what the results for my
primary hypotheses may have looked like had most of my initial sample yielded usable responses,
I replicated the 12 responses times eight and found that the means were directionally consistent
with my predictions. Although the statistical analyses from my pilot study are of low power, the
cell means were directionally consistent with the predictions in the main study: a recurring CAM
disclosure pattern, as opposed to a mixed CAM disclosure pattern, leads to more favorable
judgments of risk and more favorable investment decisions.
Based on the pilot study and feedback from workshops, I made several revisions before
launching my final study. For instance, I changed my experimental design to a 2 x 2 where I
manipulate both CAM disclosure patterns and reporting treatment at two levels. I also added a fifth
condition where no CAMs are presented. I streamlined my experimental materials as not to impose
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an unnecessary cognitive burden on participants. I implemented several data input controls to
ensure that I could match participants’ Qualtrics responses to the session recordings. I improved
my hypothesized theoretical model to ensure coherence and integration with my theoretical
assumptions. Lastly, I recruited nonprofessional investors from Prolific instead of M-Turk to
participate in my modified study.
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Chapter 4. Results
4.1 Manipulation and Attention Checks
The initial sample included 199 participants recruited from Prolific. A concern with using
participants from online labor platforms is that they may not adequately attend to the instructions
and thus provide low-quality responses. I included two attention check questions to assess that
participants adequately attended to the task instructions. After receiving specific instructions, I
asked participants to indicate whether the following statement was true or false: “I will be
redirected to Prolific upon submitting my completed survey.” The second attention check question
asked participants to indicate how many audit reports they would have to review. Four participants
incorrectly answered these attention check questions and were removed from the final sample.
I use two manipulation check questions to confirm that participants understood the
manipulations of (1) the CAM disclosure pattern and (2) the reporting treatment of the tax-related
item. The first manipulation check question asked participants to select the CAMs, from a list of
options, the CAMs that were reported in any of the auditor’s report for 2017, 2018, and 2019. The
second manipulation check question asked participants to indicate whether FHC Corporation had
elected to record (i.e., recognize) or not record (i.e., disclose) the potential federal tax liability in
the provision for income taxes account. Sixty-two participants (31 percent) failed the first
manipulation check question. Of the 62 failed manipulation checks, I identify 30 responses that
failed the manipulation check question but answered the open-ended question consistent with the
CAM disclosure pattern manipulation. Thus, I exclude 32 responses (16 percent) from the final
sample as these participants failed the manipulation check and answered the open-ended question
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inconsistent with the manipulation, indicating that they did not understand the experimental task.
Thirty participants failed the second manipulation check question. Consistent with prior literature
where participants relied on a “drill-down” feature to access information and incorrectly answered
a manipulation check question (e.g., Hodge, Kennedy, and Maines 2004; Kelton and Murthy
2016), I do not exclude those who failed the second manipulation check from the final sample. 17
After removing the manipulation and attention check failures, my final sample comprises 163
responses (82 percent). 18
4.2 The Effects of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting Treatment on Perceptions of Risk –
H1a and H2a
H1a predicts a main effect of CAM disclosure pattern on investors’ Perceptions of Risk.
Specifically, I hypothesize that investors’ Perceptions of Risk will be higher when exposed to a
mixed CAM disclosure pattern as opposed to a recurring CAM disclosure pattern. Table 2, Panel
A, provides descriptive statistics by experimental conditions for Perceptions of Risk, and Figure 1
provides a graphical representation of the means.
Table 2, Panel B, presents the results of a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
CAM disclosure pattern (pattern) and reporting treatment as the independent variables and
Perceptions of Risk as the dependent variable. To test H1a, I compare the means of recurring CAM
disclosure pattern to the mixed CAM disclosure pattern (mean 4.93 versus 4.02). The ANOVA

17

A drill-down feature is a tool that allows users to expand and collapse information. In the context of my study,
participants had to expand the footnotes to access the information in each footnote.
18
Inclusion of the manipulation check failures increases the one-tailed p-values for the main effect of pattern (H1a;
p-value = 0.014) and the joint effect pattern and reporting treatment (H2a; contrast p-value [-2,+1,+1,0] = 0.021,
contrast p-value [0, -1, -1, +2] = 0.090, residual between-cell variance p-value = 0.84) on Perceived Risk. The onetailed p-value for the main effect of pattern (H1b; p-value = 0.148) on Investment Decision is no longer significant
with the inclusion of the manipulation check failures. However, the joint effect of pattern and reporting treatment
(H2b) on Investment Decision, is partially significant with the inclusion of the manipulation check failures (contrast
p-value [+2, -1, -1, 0] = 0.020, contrast p-value [0, +1, +1, -2] = 0.128, residual between-cell variance p-value =
0.187).
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results indicate a significant main effect of CAM disclosure pattern on Perceptions of Risk (F =
6.72, one-tailed p = 0.005). Thus, H1a is supported.
H2a further predicts a joint effect of CAM disclosure pattern and reporting treatment on
investors’ Perceptions of Risk, such that investors’ Perceptions of Risk will be lowest in the
recurring CAM disclosure pattern/recognized item condition and highest in the mixed CAM
disclosure pattern/disclosed item condition. Given the nature of H2a (i.e., contrast interaction), I
conduct a planned contrast series to test my prediction, as opposed to relying on the conventional
ANOVA (Buckless and Ravencroft 1990; Guggenmos, Piercey, and Agoglia 2018): one contrast
to test that the mean for the recurring CAM disclosure pattern/recognized item condition is the
lowest [-2, +1, +1, 0], one contrast to test that the mean for the mixed CAM disclosure
pattern/disclosed item condition is the highest [0, -1, -1, +2], and one contrast to test the residual
between-cells variance [0, +1, -1, 0]. As opposed to a single custom contrast test, the three-series
contrast test approach is appropriate for the following two reasons. First, processing theory does
not warrant making a priori predictions about the relative magnitudes of effect sizes (Guggenmos
et al. 2018). Second, I am not concerned with testing a specific shape of means. Instead, I test that
a specific condition is highest and another lowest relative to the other conditions irrespective of
the means' shape. Together, my three-series contrast test approach is justified and provides a valid
basis for concluding that any effect was not due to chance (e.g., Buckless and Ravencroft 1990;
Guggenmos et al. 2018). As shown in Table 2, panel C, the contrast tests for Perceptions of Risk
are significant. 19 Together, these contrast tests provide support for H2a.

19

For robustness, I conduct a series of independent t-tests. The results of the independent t-tests are as follows
where condition A = Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B = Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item; C =
Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; and D = Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item: A versus B (t-value = 2.09,
one-tailed p-value = 0.019); A versus C (t-value = 2.09, one-tailed p-value = 0.019); A versus D (t-value = 3.53,
one-tailed p-value = < 0.001); D versus B (t-value = 1.64, one-tailed p-value = 0.051); D versus C (t-value = 1.59,
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Table 2: Effect of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting Treatment on
Perceptions of Risk – H1a and H2a
Panel A: Descriptive Results for Perceptions of Risk
Reporting Treatment

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

CAM Disclosure Pattern
Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

3.45
(2.31)
n = 40

4.54
(2.58)
n = 46

4.04
(2.50)
n = 86

4.56
(2.12)
n = 43

5.44
(2.67)
n = 34

4.95
(2.40)
n = 77
Grand Means

Column Means

4.02
(2.27)
n = 83

4.93
(2.64)
n = 80

4.47
(2.49)
n = 163
4.28
(3.00)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Participants rated Perceived Risk by indicating their level of agreement with the following statement: An
investment in FHC Corporation is a risky investment. Participant’s level of agreement was captured using an 11-point
Likert scale anchored at 0 = “Strongly disagree,” 5 = “Neither agree nor disagree,” and 10 = “Strongly agree.”

one-tailed p-value = 0.057). I also perform a single contrast coded as [-2, -1, -1, +4]. The contrast is significant (Fvalue = 9.22, one-tailed p-value = 0.001), the residual between-cell variance is insignificant (F-value = 1.74, p-value
= 0.180), and the q2 is 0.248. However, the results of the single contrast should be interpreted with caution as the
visual fit was not exact.
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Table 2 (Continued)
Panel B: ANOVA Results – Perceptions of Risk (H1a)
Source of Variance
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment
Error

Sums of
Squares
39.30
40.47
0.45
930.30

Df
1
1
1
159

Mean
Square
39.30
40.47
0.45
5.85

F-value
6.72
6.92
0.08

p-value
0.005
0.005
0.783

p-values are one-tailed if results support directional expectations, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable:
Perceptions of Risk = Participants’ agreement with the following statement captured on an 11-point scale anchored at
(0) Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “An investment in FHC Corporation is a
risky investment.”
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed

Panel C: Planned Contrasts and Residual Between-Cells Variance Test (H2a)

[-2, +1, +1, 0] for [A, B, C, D]
[0, -1, -1,+2] for [A, B, C, D]
Residual between-cells variance

Sums of
Squares
33.43
19.50
0.005

Df
1
1
1

Mean
Square
33.43
19.50
0.005

F-value

p-value

5.71
3.33
0.001

0.009
0.035
0.977

p-values are one-tailed if results support directional expectations, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable:
Perceptions of Risk = Participants’ agreement with the following statement captured on an 11-point scale anchored at
(0) Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “An investment in FHC Corporation is a
risky investment.”
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed
Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item
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10
5.44

Perceived Risk

5.5

5
4.56
Recognized

4.5
4.54

Disclosed

4

3.5
3.45
0
Recurring

Mixed

Dependent Variable:
Perceptions of Risk = Participants’ agreement with the following statement captured on an 11-point scale anchored at
(0) Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “An investment in FHC Corporation is a
risky investment.”
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed

Figure 1 – Perceived Risk as a Function of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting
Treatment
In summary, the results for Perceptions of Risk suggest that investors’ perceptions of risk
are influenced by CAM disclosure patterns and the joint effect of CAM disclosure pattern and
reporting treatment. Consistent with processing fluency, investors’ perceptions of risk were more
favorable (i.e., perceived less risk) under the CAM disclosure pattern that could be processed more
fluently (i.e., recurring CAM disclosure pattern). Furthermore, investors perceived risk to be
lowest under the most fluent condition (i.e., recurring CAM disclosure pattern/recognized item)
and highest under the most disfluent condition (i.e., mixed CAM disclosure pattern/disclosed
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item), suggesting that investors perceive CAMs as a risk signal when a company chooses to not
recognize an item on the financial statements.
4.3 The Effects of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting Treatment on Investment Decision
– H1b and H2b
Like my previous hypothesis, H1b predicts a main effect of CAM disclosure pattern on
investors’ Investment Decision, where investment amount captures investors’ Investment
Decision. Specifically, in H1b, I hypothesize that investors’ Investment Decision will be higher
when exposed to a recurring CAM disclosure pattern as opposed to a mixed CAM disclosure
pattern. Table 3, Panel A, provides descriptive statistics by experimental conditions for Investment
Decision, and Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the means.
Table 3, Panel B, presents the results of a two-way ANOVA with CAM disclosure pattern
(pattern) and reporting treatment as the independent variables and Investment Decision as the
dependent variable. To test H1b, I compare the means of recurring CAM disclosure pattern to the
mixed CAM disclosure pattern (mean $4,024.10 versus $3,275.00). The ANOVA results indicate
a significant main effect of CAM disclosure pattern on Investment Decision (F = 5.41, one-tailed
p = 0.011). Thus, H1b is supported.
H2b further predicts a joint effect of CAM disclosure pattern and reporting treatment on
investors’ Investment Decision, such that investors’ Investment Decision will be highest in the
recurring CAM disclosure pattern/recognized item condition and lowest in the mixed CAM
disclosure pattern/disclosed item condition. To test my predicted contrast interaction, I conduct a
series of planned contrast, as opposed to relying on the conventional ANOVA (Buckless and
Ravencroft 1990; Guggenmos, Piercey, and Agoglia 2018): one contrast to test that the mean for
the recurring CAM disclosure pattern/recognized item condition is the highest [+2, -1, -1, 0], one
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contrast to test that the mean for the mixed CAM disclosure pattern/disclosed item condition is the
lowest [0, +1, +1, -2], and one contrast to test the residual between-cells variance [0, +1, -1, 0]. As
shown in Table 3, panel C, the contrast tests for Investment Decision are significant. 20 Together,
the contrast tests provide support for H2b.
The results for Investment Decision suggest that the amount investors invest in a company
is influenced by CAM disclosure patterns and jointly by CAM disclosure pattern and reporting
treatment. Consistent with processing fluency, investors’ investment amount was more favorable
(i.e., invest more money) under the CAM disclosure pattern that can be processed more fluently
(i.e., recurring CAM disclosure pattern). Furthermore, investors invested the highest amount under
the most fluent condition (i.e., recurring CAM disclosure pattern/recognized item) and the lowest
amount under the most disfluent condition (i.e., mixed CAM disclosure pattern/disclosed item).
Combined with the results for Perceptions of Risk, these results suggest that not only do investors
perceive CAMs as a risk signal when a company chooses not to recognize an item on the financial
statements, but they also adjust their investment decision accordingly.

20

For robustness, I conduct a series of independent t-tests. The results of the independent t-tests are as follows
where condition A = Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B = Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item; C =
Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; and D = Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item: A versus B (t-value = 2.12,
one-tailed p-value = 0.018); A versus C (t-value = 2.51, one-tailed p-value = 0.007); A versus D (t-value = 3.54,
one-tailed p-value = < 0.001); D versus B (t-value = 1.65, one-tailed p-value = 0.053); D versus C (t-value = 1.20,
one-tailed p-value = 0.117). I also perform a single contrast coded as [+4, -1, -1, -2]. The contrast is significant (Fvalue = 12.61, one-tailed p-value < 0.001), the residual between-cell variance is insignificant (F-value = 0.38, pvalue = 0.686), and the q2 is 0.054. However, the results of the single contrast should be interpreted with caution as
the visual fit was not exact.
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Table 3: Effect of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting Treatment on
Investment Decision – H1b and H2b
Panel A: Descriptive Results for Investment Decision ($)
Reporting Treatment

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

CAM Disclosure Pattern
Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

4,675.00
(2,017.71)
n = 40

3,630.43
(2,132.90)
n = 46

4,116.28
(2,133.31)
n = 86

3,418.60
(2,574.90)
n = 43

2,794.12
(2,345.59)
n = 34

3,142.86
(2,480.00)
n = 77
Grand Means

Column Means

4,024.10
(2,393.98)
n = 83

3,275.00
(2,250.04)
n = 80

3,656.44
(2,347.52)
n = 163
3,698.11
(2,839.18)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Participants indicated their Investment Decision by indicating how much they would invest in FHC
Corporation, assuming they had $10,000 to invest. Participants’ investment amount was captured using an 11-point
Likert scale anchored at $0 = “None of it,” $5,000 = “Some of it,” and $10,000 = “All of it.”

40

Table 3 (Continued)
Panel B: ANOVA Results – Investment Decision (H1b)
Source of Variance
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment
Error

Sums of
Squares
28023614.74
44055834.68
1775189.09
823516331.10

Df
1
1
1
159

Mean
Square
28023614.74
44055834.86
1775189.09
5179347.99

F-value
5.41
8.51
0.34

pvalue
0.011
0.002
0.559

p-values are one-tailed if results support directional expectations, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable:
Investment Decision = Participants’ investment amount captured on an 11-point scale anchored at ($0) None of it,
($5,000) Some of it, ($10,000) All of it.
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed

Panel C: Planned Contrasts and Residual Between-Cells Variance Test (H2b)

[+2, -1, -1, 0] for [A, B, C, D]
[0, +1, +1, -2] for [A, B, C, D]
Residual between-cells
variance

Sums of
Squares
36514511.25
13120526.63

1
1

Mean
Square
36514511.25
13120526.63

1

997267.70

Df

997267.70

7.05
2.53

pvalue
0.005
0.057

0.19

0.661

F-value

p-values are one-tailed if results support directional expectations, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable:
Investment Decision = Participants’ investment amount captured on an 11-point scale anchored at ($0) None of it,
($5,000) Some of it, ($10,000) All of it.
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed
Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item
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10,000

Investment Amount ($)

4,675.00
4,500

Recognized
3,630.43

Disclosed

3,500
3,418.60

2,794.12
0
Recurring

Mixed

Dependent Variable:
Investment Decision = Participants’ investment amount captured on an 11-point scale anchored at ($0) None of it,
($5,000) Some of it, ($10,000) All of it.
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed

Figure 2 – Investment Amount as a Function of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting
Treatment
4.4 The Effect of CAM Disclosure Pattern on Perceptions of Quality – RQ1
RQ1 considers whether CAM disclosure pattern significantly influences investors’
Perceptions of Audit Quality and Perception of Financial Reporting Quality, respectively.
Specifically, I expect to find a significant difference only if investors interpret CAM disclosure
patterns as a signal of quality. Alternatively, I expect there will be no significant difference if
investors interpret CAM disclosures as intended by the PCAOB (i.e., a communication of audit
areas that were particularly challenging, subjective, or complex). Table 4, Panels A and B, present
descriptive statistics by experimental conditions for Perceived Audit Quality and Perceived

42

Financial Reporting Quality, respectively. Figures 3 and 4 provide a graphical representation of
the means for each dependent variable.
Table 4, Panel C, presents the results of a two-way multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) with CAM disclosure pattern (pattern) and reporting treatment as the independent
variables and Perceived Audit Quality and Perceived Financial Reporting Quality as the dependent
variables (Pearson Correlation = 0.45, p < 0.001). I treat both dependent variables as distinct
variables given their scale reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.59). I compare the means of the recurring
CAM disclosure pattern to the mixed CAM disclosure pattern conditions for Perceived Audit
Quality (mean 8.35 versus 8.10) and Perceived Financial Reporting Quality (mean 6.90 versus
6.42). The results, shown in panel D of Table 4, indicate that CAM disclosure pattern is
insignificant for Perceived Audit Quality (F = 1.50, p = 0.223) and Perceived Financial Reporting
Quality (F = 0.78, p = 0.379).
In summary, the results for Perceived Audit Quality and Perceived Financial Reporting
Quality show that CAM disclosure patterns do not influence investors’ perceptions of audit quality
and financial reporting quality. The results suggest that investors do not perceive CAM disclosure
patterns as a signal of quality, which aligns with the PCAOB’s stance that CAMs are not meant to
reflect negatively on the company or the auditor and do not alter the auditor’s opinion on the
financial statements (PCAOB 2017).
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Table 4: Effect of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting Treatment on
Perceptions of Quality
Panel A: Descriptive Results for Perceived Audit Quality
Reporting Treatment

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

Column Means

CAM Disclosure Pattern
Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

8.50
(1.38)
n = 40

8.04
(1.78)
n = 46

8.26
(1.61)
n = 86

8.19
(1.50)
n = 43

8.03
(1.66)
n = 34

8.12
(1.56)
n = 77

8.34
(1.44)
n = 83

8.04
(1.72)
n = 80

Grand Means
8.19
(1.59)
n = 163
7.94
(2.23)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Participants rated Perceived Audit Quality by indicating their level of agreement with the following statement:
The audit of FHC Corporation was performed thoroughly. Participant’s level of agreement was captured using an 11point Likert scale anchored at 0 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “Neither agree nor disagree,” and 10 = “Strongly agree.”
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Table 4 (Continued)
Panel B: Descriptive Results for Perceived Financial Reporting Quality
Reporting Treatment

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

CAM Disclosure Pattern
Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

7.03
(2.48)
n = 40

6.52
(2.47)
n = 46

6.76
(2.47)
n = 86

6.61
(1.94)
n = 43

6.47
(2.22)
n = 34

6.55
(2.06)
n = 77
Grand Means

Column Means

6.81
(2.21)
n = 83

6.50
(2.36)
n = 80

6.66
(2.23)
n = 163
7.51
(2.69)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Participants rated Perceived Financial Reporting Quality by indicating their level of agreement with the
following statement: FHC Corporation's financial reports did NOT contain errors. Participant’s level of agreement
was captured using an 11-point Likert scale anchored at 0 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “Neither agree nor disagree,” and
10 = “Strongly agree.”

Panel C: MANOVA Results for Perceived Audit Quality and Perceived Financial Reporting
Quality
Source
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment

Wilk’s
Lambda
0.82
1.00

0.99
0.30

Num
df
2
2

Den
df
158
158

0.22

2

158

F-value

1.00

p-value
0.444
0.745
0.806

Dependent Variables:
Perceived Audit Quality = Participants’ agreement with the following statement captured on an 11-point scale
anchored at (0) Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “The audit of FHC Corporation
was performed thoroughly.”
Perceived Financial Reporting Quality = Participants’ agreement with the following statement captured on an 11point scale anchored at (0) Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “FHC Corporation's
financial reports did NOT contain errors.”
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed
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Table 4 (Continued)
Panel D: Specific Tests (RQ1)
Sums of
Squares

df

F-value

p-value

Perceived Audit Quality
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment
Error

3.78
1.08
0.91
401.40

1
1
1
159

1.50
0.43
0.36

0.223
0.514
0.550

Perceived Financial Reporting Quality
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment
Error

4.09
2.24
1.37
835.20

1
1
1
159

0.78
0.43
0.26

0.379
0.515
0.610

p-values are one-tailed if results support directional expectations, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variables:
Perceived Audit Quality = Participants’ agreement with the following statement captured on an 11-point scale
anchored at (0) Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “The audit of FHC Corporation
was performed thoroughly.”
Perceived Financial Reporting Quality = Participants’ agreement with the following statement captured on an 11point scale anchored at (0) Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “FHC Corporation's
financial reports did NOT contain errors.”
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed
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10

Perceived Audit Quality

8.50
8.5

Recognized
8.04

8.19

Disclosed

8
8.03

0
Recurring

Mixed

Dependent Variable:
Perceived Audit Quality = Participants’ agreement with the following statement captured on an 11-point scale
anchored at (0) Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “The audit of FHC Corporation
was performed thoroughly.”
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed

Figure 3 – Perceived Audit Quality as a Function of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting
Treatment
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Perceived Financial Reporting Quality

10

7.03
7

Recognized
6.52
6.5

Disclosed

6.61
6.47

0
Recurring

Mixed

Dependent Variable:
Perceived Financial Reporting Quality = Participants’ agreement with the following statement captured on an 11point scale anchored at (0) Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “FHC Corporation's
financial reports did NOT contain errors.”
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed

Figure 4 – Perceived Financial Reporting Quality as a Function of CAM Disclosure Pattern
and Reporting Treatment
4.5 Additional Analyses
4.5.1 Information Processing
As indicated earlier, repeated exposure to a stimulus is one way to enhance processing
fluency (Bornstein and D’Agostino 1994; Jacoby and Dallas 1981). In the context of reading,
research finds that individuals process text (i.e., read) more fluently with repeated exposure to the
same text (Hyona and Niemi 1990). In other words, individuals spend less time re-reading text
they have previously read (Hyona and Niemi 1990). Accordingly, I expect that participants' time
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to process the recurring CAM will continuously decline as participants experience greater
processing fluency. However, processing fluency towards the recurring CAM will be disrupted
when participants have to process a new CAM (i.e., transient CAM). Recall that in the mixed CAM
condition, a recurring CAM is presented in all three years, and a transient CAM is also presented
in year 2. In contrast, in the recurring CAM condition, only the recurring CAM is presented in all
three years.
I capture participants’ information processing via an unobtrusive cognitive processing
measure. Namely, I rely on session recordings captured to measure the level of processing
participants engaged in while reviewing the information presented within the investor relations
site. A total of 113 session recordings were captured, 21 of which 27 were in the fifth condition (i.e.,
control condition), one contained incomplete data, and eight were identified as extreme outliers.
Thus, I base my analysis on 77 session recordings.
Table 5, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics by CAM disclosure pattern condition for
time spent (in seconds) on the recurring CAM. Figure 5 presents a visual representation of time
spent (in seconds) on the recurring CAM for each of the three years (i.e., 2017, 2018, 2019). I
focus on participants’ time spent on the recurring CAM instead of total time on all CAMs because
participants will inherently spend more time in the mixed CAM condition because this condition
includes an additional CAM. Therefore, the comparison would not be equal across conditions.
Furthermore, processing fluency from mere exposure is likely to be exhibited through participants’
attention to the repeated stimulus (i.e., recurring CAM) instead of a novel stimulus (i.e., transient
CAM).

21

Some user sessions were not captured as Hotjar may have been unable to track the user. Some common reasons
why Hotjar may not track someone include: unsupported web browser, disabled JavaScript, participants did not do
anything while on site, disabled cookies, do not track setting enabled in viewer’s browser, presence of ad-block or
other privacy-enhancing extensions, etc.
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Dependent Variable:
Attention = Time spent reviewing only the recurring CAM in seconds.
Independent Variables:
Year = 2017 Audit Report (i.e., year 1), 2018 Audit Report (i.e., year), and 2019 Audit Report (i.e., year 3)

Figure 5 – Attention over time to recurring CAM compared across CAM Disclosure
Patterns
I perform a repeated-measures ANOVA with audit report year as the within-group factor
and CAM disclosure pattern as the between-group factor. The results show a significant difference
across years (F = 15.22, p < 0.001). Pairwise comparisons, shown in Table 5, Panel C, reveal that
there are no significant differences between conditions in 2017 (Mean Difference = -6.35; p-value
= 0.673) and 2018 (Mean Difference = 6.92; p-value = 0.455), but there is a significant difference
between conditions in 2019 (Mean Difference = -16.05; p-value = 0.026). Additional pairwise
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comparisons show that in the recurring CAM disclosure pattern condition, the mean time spent
on the recurring CAM in year 1 (2017) versus year 2 (2018) is significantly different (mean 84.74
versus 45.26; p-value < 0.001), and the mean time spent in year 2 (2018) versus year 3 (2019) is
also significantly different (mean 45.26 versus 23.43; p-value = 0.003). In the mixed CAM
disclosure pattern condition, the mean time spent on the recurring CAM in year 1 (2017) versus
year 2 (2018) is significantly different (mean 91.10 versus 38.33; p-value < 0.001), but the mean
time spent in year 2 (2018) versus year 3 (2019) is not (mean 38.33 versus 39.48; p-value = 0.862).
I conduct a supplemental analysis to examine if the mean difference in attention to the
recurring CAM from year 1 (2017) to year 2 (2018) and year 2 (2018) to year 3 (2019) differ
between CAM disclosure pattern conditions. First, I ensure that the year 1 mean of 87.28 in the
recurring CAM disclosure pattern condition is not significantly different from the 108.87 mean in
the mixed CAM disclosure pattern condition. An independent t-test confirms that these means are
not significantly different (t-value = -0.423; p-value = 0.673). Second, I compare the mean
differences between the recurring and mixed CAM disclosure pattern conditions for the 2017 to
2018 period (mean difference -39.48 versus -52.76) and the 2018 to 2019 period (mean difference
-21.83 versus 1.14). Table 5, Panel D, presents the results of a one-way ANOVA with the mean
differences as the dependent variables and CAM disclosure pattern as the independent variable.
The ANOVA results revealed that the decrease in attention to the recurring CAM from year 1 to
year 2 for the mixed CAM pattern condition is not significantly different than the decrease in
attention experienced by those in the recurring CAM pattern condition (F = 0.98, one-tailed p =
0.326). However, the change in attention to the recurring CAM from year 2 to year 3 for the
recurring CAM pattern condition is significantly different than the change in attention experienced
by those in the mixed CAM pattern condition (F = 5.56, one-tailed p = 0.021). As a reference point,

51

I include a data point showing the mean attention given to the transient CAM, which helps explain
why the attention to the recurring CAM was disrupted in the mixed CAM disclosure pattern
condition in 2018. An independent t-test confirms that the attention to the transient CAM was
significantly greater than the attention to the recurring CAM (mean 54.81 versus 38.33; one-tailed
p-value = 0.020). This result suggests that investors experience an attentional trade-off when a
transient CAM is introduced, disrupting processing fluency.
Table 5: Effect of CAM Disclosure Pattern on Attention to recurring CAM
Panel A: Mean Attention in seconds (standard deviation)
CAM Disclosure Pattern

Year
2017

2018

2019

Recurring (n = 35)

84.74
(68.50)

45.26
(44.84)

23.43
(23.51)

Mixed (n = 42)

91.10
(62.99)

38.33
(36.13)

39.48
(35.75)

88.21
(65.19)

41.48
(40.20)

32.18
(31.64)

Column Means (n = 77)

Notes: Participants' attention was measured via a behavior analytics application. The numbers reflected in this table
represent the number of seconds spent reading over the recurring CAM.

Panel B: Test of Within-group Effects (Attention by Audit Report Year)
Source of Variance
Year
Year x Pattern
Error (Year)
a

Sums of
Squares
16294.43

1

Mean
Square
16294.43

4180.56

1

4180.56

80311.25

75

1070.82

Df

F-Stat
15.22

< 0.001

3.90

0.051

Based on quadratic terms

Dependent Variable:
Attention = number of seconds spent reading over the recurring CAM
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Year = Year 1 (2017), Year 2 (2018), Year 3 (2019)
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p-valuea

Table 5 (Continued)
Panel C: Pairwise Comparisons
Mean
Std.
p-value
Difference
Error
Mean Comparisons by Year (Recurring versus Mixed CAM Disclosure Pattern)
2017

-6.35

15.00

0.673

2018

6.92

9.23

0.455

2019

-16.05

7.05

0.026

2017 to 2018

-39.48

9.91

< 0.001

2018 to 2019

-21.83

7.20

0.003

Overall: 2017 to 2019

-61.31

10.79

< 0.001

2017 to 2018

-52.76

9.05

< 0.001

2018 to 2019

1.14

6.57

0.862

-51.62

9.85

< 0.001

Recurring CAM Disclosure Pattern

Mixed CAM Disclosure Pattern

Overall: 2017 to 2019

Panel D: One-Way ANOVA Results – Mean Differences
Source of Variance
2017 to 2018
2018 to 2019

Sums of
Squares
3364.91
10074.02

Df
1
1

Mean
Square
3364.91
10074.02

F-value
0.98
5.56

p-value
0.326
0.021

Collectively, the results provide evidence consistent with my theoretical argument
regarding processing fluency. In the recurring CAM disclosure pattern condition, nonprofessional
investors process the recurring CAM more fluently, evidenced by the sustained decrease in
attention over time. Conversely, in the mixed CAM disclosure pattern condition, the decrease in
investors’ attention to the recurring CAM is disrupted when a new CAM emerges.
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4.5.2 Source Credibility
Signaling theory suggests that a signal’s perceived source credibility can influence a
signal’s effectiveness. I asked participants to assess the credibility of the auditor’s reports and the
credibility of the financial reports at being accurate (i.e., participants’ perceived trust that the
auditor’s reports and the financial reports provide accurate and full disclosures). I create a new
variable, Perceived Credibility, based on the average of the two credibility measures (Cronbach’s
α = 0.88) and use this new variable in my analysis. Table 6, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics
by condition for Perceived Credibility.
Table 6, Panel B, presents the results of a two-way ANOVA with CAM disclosure pattern
(pattern) and reporting treatment as the independent variables and Perceived Credibility as the
dependent variable. The ANOVA results revealed that only reporting treatment significantly
affects perceived credibility (F = 14.20, p < 0.001). Overall, participants perceive higher credibility
when an item is recognized versus disclosed and perceive equal levels of credibility regardless of
CAM disclosure pattern. However, paired comparisons between the control condition and the other
conditions reveal that given a recognized item, both a recurring and mixed CAM disclosure pattern
leads to higher perceived credibility than the control condition (see Table 6, Panel C). Consistent
with experimental research finding that nonprofessional investors assess higher perceived
reliability (i.e., information’s representational faithfulness) when information is more salient
(Clor-Proell, Proell, and Warfield 2014), these results suggest that CAM disclosures, regardless of
pattern, are an effective credibility signal that improves investors’ Perceptions of Credibility when
a company chooses to recognize an item.
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Table 6: Effect of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting Treatment on
Perceptions of Credibility
Panel A: Descriptive Results for Perceived Credibility
Reporting Treatment

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

Column Means

CAM Disclosure Pattern
Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

7.83
(1.63)
n = 40

7.53
(1.78)
n = 46

7.67
(1.71)
n = 86

6.85
(1.84)
n = 43

6.26
(2.34)
n = 34

6.59
(2.08)
n = 77

7.32
(1.80)
n = 83

6.99
(2.12)
n = 80

Grand Means
7.16
(1.96)
n = 163
6.53
(2.29)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Perceived Credibility is based on the average of Perceived Audit Report Credibility and Perceived Financial
Reporting Credibility. Participants rated Audit Report Credibility by assessing the credibility of auditor’s reports at
ensuring the accuracy of the financial reports and Financial Reporting Credibility by assessing the credibility of the
financial reports at being accurate. Participant’s responses were captured using an 11-point Likert scale anchored at 0
= “No credibility,” 5 = “Moderate credibility,” and 10 = “High credibility.”

Panel B: ANOVA Results – Perceived Credibility
Source of Variance
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment
Error

Sums of
Squares
7.73
50.66
0.86
567.36

Df
1
1
1
159

Mean
Square
7.73
50.66
0.86
3.57

F-value
2.17
14.20
0.24

pvalue
0.143
<0.001
0.625

Dependent Variable:
Perceived Credibility = average of Perceived Audit Report Credibility and Perceived Financial Reporting Credibility.
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed
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Table 6 (continued)
Panel C: Control Condition Paired Comparisons on Perceived Credibility
Mean
Difference

Std. Error

t-value

p-value

Control Condition versus:
Condition A

1.30

0.42

3.10

0.002

Condition B

1.00

0.40

2.50

0.013

Condition C

0.32

0.41

0.78

0.435

Condition D

-0.26

0.44

-0.60

0.548

Dependent Variable:
Perceived Credibility = average of Perceived Audit Report Credibility and Perceived Financial Reporting Credibility.
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed
Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item

4.5.3 Mediation Analyses
To further explain the hypotheses testing findings, I conduct mediation analyses using
SPSS AMOS version 27 to perform an SEM analysis. 22 Figure 6 reports the path model results,
including Perceived Credibility, Perceived Quality, and Perceived Risk as mediators and
Investment Decision as dependent variables. I examine various model fit indices to ensure that the
model has a good fit (χ2 = 3.07, p = 0.55; CFI = 100%; GFI = 99.4%; RMSEA = 0.000). I also
ensure that the minimum discrepancy divided by the degrees of freedom is below the cut-off point
of 3.00 (χ2/df = 0.77).

22

There is no consensus for the appropriate sample size for SEM, and there is some evidence that SEM can be
effective even with small sample sizes (Wang and Wang 2012). Numerous accounting studies have utilized SEM
with small sample sizes (see Brink and Hansen 2020 for one example of this).
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Reporting
Treatment

Perceived
Quality

-0.14**

-0.10

+0.71***
-0.06

0.29***

Perceived
Credibility

Investment
Decision

0.14**

-0.11
-0.52***

-0.35***

CAM
Pattern

Perceived
Risk

0.16**

*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed significance at less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
CAM Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed
Perceived Credibility = Participants’ composite rating of the credibility of the audit reports and financial reports at
being accurate. Participant’s responses were captured using an 11-point Likert scale anchored at 0 = “No credibility,”
5 = “Moderate credibility,” and 10 = “High credibility.”
Perceived Quality = Participants’ composite agreement with the following statements captured on an 11-point scale
anchored at (0) Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “The audit of FHC Corporation
was performed thoroughly,” and “FHC Corporation's financial reports did NOT contain errors.”
Perceived Risk = Participants’ agreement with the following statement captured on an 11-point scale anchored at (0)
Strongly disagree, (5) Neither agree nor disagree, (10) Strongly agree: “An investment in FHC Corporation is a risky
investment.”
Investment Decision = Participants’ investment amount captured on an 11-point scale anchored at (0) None of it, (5)
Some of it, (10) All of it.

Figure 6 – Path Model
Results from the path model indicate the presence of a serial-mediation effect, with
Perceived Credibility, Perceived Quality, and Perceived Risk mediating the individual effects of
CAM Pattern and Reporting Treatment on Investment Decision. Overall, both CAM Pattern and
Reporting Treatment have an indirect effect on investment. However, different factors mediate
their effect.
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Table 7 presents the results of specific indirect effects. The specific indirect effects analysis
reveals a significant indirect effect from CAM Pattern to Investment Decision through Perceived
Risk (Unstandardized Coefficient = -376.54, p = 0.024). Conversely, Reporting Treatment has a
significant indirect effect on Investment Decision through Perceived Credibility (Unstandardized
Coefficient = 190.05, p = 0.018) as well as Perceived Credibility and Perceived Risk
(Unstandardized Coefficient = 239.90, p = 0.002).

Table 7: Specific Indirect Effects for CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting Treatment on
Investment Decision
Unstandardized
Path Estimate

LLCIa

ULCIa

p-value

-376.54

-783.91

-42.77

0.024

-73.04

-256.71

9.41

0.101

-92.19

-307.23

20.86

0.121

-11.58

-98.27

16.66

0.328

239.71

-100.59

645.93

0.151

190.05

26.52

461.25

0.018

-23.68

-147.37

42.342

0.374

239.90

69.09

518.54

0.002

30.14

-62.02

152.48

0.473

Specific Indirect Effect of CAM
Pattern:
to Perceived Risk to Investment
Decision
to Perceived Credibility to
Investment Decision
to Perceived Credibility to Perceived
Risk to Investment Decision
to Perceived Credibility to Perceived
Quality to Perceived Risk to
Investment Decision
Specific Indirect Effect of Reporting
Treatment:
to Perceived Risk to Investment
Decision
to Perceived Credibility to
Investment Decision
to Perceived Quality to Perceived
Risk to Investment Decision
to Perceived Credibility to Perceived
Risk to Investment Decision
to Perceived Credibility to Perceived
Quality to Perceived Risk to
Investment Decision
a

Significance of the indirect effects is evaluated at 95 percent confidence intervals, obtained through bootstrapping.
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Collectively, the results suggest that CAM disclosure patterns influence investment
decisions primarily through changes in risk perceptions. Investors perceive higher risk when
exposed to a mixed CAM pattern, thus investing lower amounts of money as perceptions of risk
increase. Conversely, reporting treatment influences investment decisions primarily through
changes in perceptions of credibility. That is, investors perceive financial information as more
credible when an item is recognized, reducing perceptions of risk and leading to higher investment.
Similarly, a recognized item increases perceived credibility, leading to higher investment. The
conclusion that investment decisions are primarily influenced through Perceived Risk for CAM
pattern and Perceived Credibility for reporting treatment is further supported by the significant
direct effect from CAM Pattern to Perceived Risk (Coefficient = 0.16, p = 0.027), the insignificant
direct effect from Reporting Treatment to Perceived Risk (Coefficient = -0.10, p = 0.181), the
insignificant direct effect from CAM Pattern to Perceived Credibility (Coefficient = -0.11, p =
0.145), and the significant direct effect from Reporting Treatment to Perceived Credibility (0.29,
p < 0.001).
4.5.4 Attitude Towards Audit Reports
To assess potential alternative explanations for my results, I measure participants’ attitudes
towards the audit report using a six-item question. Participants rated each item using a 7-point
semantic differential scale anchored by descriptions (e.g., good, interesting, informative,
appropriate, easy to understand, and objective) of the audit report and their negation (e.g., bad, not
interesting, not informative, inappropriate, difficult to understand, subjective). A principal
component analysis of the six items extracted one component for which the Cronbach’s alpha of
0.80 indicates good reliability. Thus, I combine all six items into a new variable labeled Attitude.
Table 8, Panel A, presents descriptive results by experimental condition for Attitude.
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Table 8: Effect of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting Treatment on
Attitude Towards Audit Report
Panel A: Descriptive Results for Attitude
Reporting Treatment

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

Column Means

CAM Disclosure Pattern
Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

5.20
(1.06)
n = 40

5.04
(1.10)
n = 46

5.12
(1.08)
n = 86

4.95
(0.94)
n = 43

4.80
(0.97)
n = 34

4.88
(0.95)
n = 77

5.07
(1.00)
n = 83

4.94
(1.05)
n = 80

Grand Means
5.01
(1.03)
n = 163
5.04
(1.23)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Attitude is based on the average of six items where participants rated their attitude towards the audit reports
using a 7-point semantic differential scale anchored by descriptions (e.g., good, interesting, informative, appropriate,
easy to understand, and objective) of the audit report and their negation (e.g., bad, not interesting, not informative,
inappropriate, difficult to understand, subjective).

Panel B: ANOVA Results – Attitude
Source of Variance
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment
Error

Sums of
Squares
0.92
2.50
0.004
166.95

Df
1
1
1
159

Mean
Square
0.92
2.50
0.004
1.05

F-value
0.88
2.38
0.003

p-value
0.351
0.125
0.953

Dependent Variable:
Attitude = average of six items where participants rated their attitude towards the audit reports using a 7-point semantic
differential scale anchored by descriptions (e.g., good, interesting, informative, appropriate, easy to understand, and
objective) of the audit report and their negation (e.g., bad, not interesting, not informative, inappropriate, difficult to
understand, subjective).
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed
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The ANOVA results show insignificant effects for both CAM disclosure pattern and
Reporting Treatment on participants’ attitude towards the audit reports, suggesting that neither
influence participants’ overall positive attitude towards the audit reports. In conjunction with
previous analyses, these results imply that investors’ attitude towards the audit report remains
positive overall, even when perceptions of risk and investment decisions differ due to different
CAM disclosure patterns.
4.5.5 Information Weighting
To gauge whether participants weighted the importance of information differently across
conditions, participants assigned a weight to each of the following items, where the sum of the
weights had to total 100, based on their importance when evaluating the company: financial
statements, notes to the financial statement, and independent auditor’s report. Using the weights
participants assigned to each source of information, I examine whether the importance of each
information source differed by condition. Table 9, Panels A through C, presents descriptive results
for the weights participants assigned to each information source.
Table 9, Panels D and E, present the results of a two-way MANOVA with CAM disclosure
pattern (pattern) and reporting treatment as the independent variables and Importance Weighting
for each of the information sources as the dependent variables. The results show a main effect of
reporting treatment on Importance Weighting for financial reports (F = 4.00, p = 0.05), as well as
the notes to the financial statements (F = 7.81, p < 0.01). In other words, participants assigned
more importance to the financial reports under the recognized reporting treatment than the
disclosed reporting treatment (mean 44.76 versus 39.65). Furthermore, participants placed greater
importance on the notes to the financial statements (mean 30.74 versus 24.65) under the disclosed
reporting treatment instead of the recognized reporting treatment. The results also show an
interaction effect of CAM disclosure pattern and reporting treatment on the Importance Weighting
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assigned to the notes to the financial statements (F = 4.51, p = 0.04). Table 9, Panel F, shows the
contrast test results testing the cell means using the Guggenmos et al. (2018) approach. The
contrast test results reveal an ordinal interaction where participants place greater importance on
the notes to the financial statements under a mixed CAM disclosure pattern versus a recurring
CAM disclosure pattern given a disclosed item (mean 35.15 versus 27.26). However, CAM
disclosure pattern has no effect given a recognized item (mean 23.74 versus 25.70). Lastly, paired
comparisons evaluating the control condition against the experimental conditions (see Table 9,
Panels G through I) suggest that absent any CAMs, participants assess the importance of the
various information sources nearly equally. However, CAM disclosure patterns increase the
assessed importance of the financial reports and decrease the assessed importance of the notes to
the financial statements for three of the four experimental conditions compared to the control
condition, suggesting that CAM disclosure patterns and reporting treatment jointly influence the
perceived importance of information sources to nonprofessional investors’ decision-making.
To summarize, the results suggest that nonprofessional investors rely on the different
sources of information equally absent any CAMs. Not surprisingly, the results suggest that
nonprofessional investors rely on financial statements to a greater extent when an item is
recognized instead of disclosed regardless of CAM disclosure pattern. The results further suggest
that while nonprofessional investors’ reliance on the notes to the financial statements is greater
when an item is disclosed versus recognized, the effect is driven by the signaling characteristics of
CAM disclosures. Compared to the other experimental conditions, nonprofessional investors
assessed the greatest level of importance to the financial statement notes when a CAM related to
a disclosed item was present (i.e., mixed CAM disclosure/disclosed item condition). This finding
suggests that a transient CAM possesses signaling properties under a mixed CAM disclosure

62

pattern such that nonprofessional investors rely more heavily on the notes with a disclosed item
than a recognized item.
Table 9: Effect of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting Treatment on
Importance Weighting by Information Source
Panel A: Descriptive Results for Importance Weighting of Financial Reports
Reporting Treatment

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

Column Means

CAM Disclosure Pattern
Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

44.43
(19.92)
n = 40

45.04
(15.12)
n = 46

44.76
(17.42)
n = 86

42.02
(15.78)
n = 43

36.65
(17.71)
n = 34

43.18
(17.83)
n = 83

41.48
(16.69)
n = 80

39.65
(16.76)
n = 77
Grand Means
42.34
(17.25)
n = 163
35.96
(16.41)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Participants assessed the relative importance of three information sources: financial reports, notes to the
financial statements, and audit reports. The sum of the weights assigned to each information source had to equal 100.
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Table 9 (continued)
Panel B: Descriptive Results for Importance Weighting of Notes to Financial Statements
Reporting Treatment

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

Column Means

CAM Disclosure Pattern
Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

25.70
(11.55)
n = 40

23.74
(12.56)
n = 46

24.65
(12.07)
n = 86

27.26
(13.56)
n = 43

35.15
(20.87)
n = 34

26.51
(12.58)
n = 83

28.59
(17.44)
n = 80

30.74
(17.50)
n = 77
Grand Means
27.53
(15.15)
n = 163
34.60
(18.49)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Participants assessed the relative importance of three information sources: financial reports, notes to the
financial statements, and audit reports. The sum of the weights assigned to each information source had to equal 100.

Panel C: Descriptive Results for Importance Weighting of Notes to Audit Reports
Reporting Treatment

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

Column Means

CAM Disclosure Pattern
Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

29.88
(17.32)
n = 40

31.22
(13.78)
n = 46

30.59
(15.45)
n = 86

30.72
(14.94)
n = 43

28.21
(15.47)
n = 34

30.31
(16.03)
n = 83

29.94
(14.51)
n = 80

29.61
(15.12)
n = 77
Grand Means
30.13
(15.26)
n = 163
29.43
(16.42)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Participants assessed the relative importance of three information sources: financial reports, notes to the
financial statements, and audit reports. The sum of the weights assigned to each information source had to equal 100.
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Table 9 (continued)
Panel D: MANOVA Results for Importance Weighting
Source
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment

Wilk’s
Lambda
0.99
0.95

0.84
4.05

Num
df
2
2

Den
df
158
158

2.24

2

158

F-value

0.97

p-value
0.44
0.02
0.10

Panel E: Specific Tests for Importance Weighting by Information Source
Sums of
Squares

df

F-value

p-value

Financial Reports
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment
Error

227.71
1172.96
361.51
46576.43

1
1
1
159

0.78
4.00
1.23

0.38
0.05
0.27

Notes to Financial Statements
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment
Error

353.79
1690.62
976.44
34399.72

1
1
1
159

1.64
7.81
4.51

0.20
<0.01
0.04

Audit Reports
Pattern
Reporting Treatment
Pattern x Reporting Treatment
Error

13.83
47.18
149.69
37506.41

1
1
1
159

0.06
0.20
0.64

0.81
0.66
0.43

Information Source

Dependent Variables:
Importance Weighting = Participants’ assessment of the relative importance of three information sources: financial
reports, notes to the financial statements, and audit reports. The sum of the weights assigned to each information
source had to equal 100.
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed
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Table 9 (continued)
Panel F: Residual Between-Cells Variance Test for Importance Weighting to Notes to the
Financial Statements

[-1, -1, -1, +3] for [A, B, C, D]
Residual between-cells variance
Total between-cells variance
Error
Total
Contrast Variance Residual, q
[-1, -1, 0, +2] for [A, B, C, D]

2

Sums of
Squares
2468.91
302.00

1
2

Mean
Square
2468.91
151.00

2770.91

3

923.64

34399.72

159

216.35

37170.63

162

9.7%
2645.79

1

Df

F-value

2645.79

p-value

11.41
0.70

< 0.001
0.50

4.27

< 0.01

12.23

<0.001

Dependent Variables:
Importance Weighting = Participants’ assessment of the relative importance of three information sources: financial
reports, notes to the financial statements, and audit reports. The sum of the weights assigned to each information
source had to equal 100.
Independent Variables:
Pattern = 1 if CAM disclosure pattern is mixed; 0 if CAM disclosure pattern is recurring
Reporting Treatment = 1 if tax-related item is recognized; 0 if tax-related item is disclosed
Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item

Panel G: Control Condition Paired Comparisons on Importance Weighting to Financial
Reports
Mean
Difference
Control Condition
(mean = 35.96)
versus:
Condition A
(mean = 44.43)
Condition B
(mean = 45.04)
Condition C
(mean = 42.02)
Condition D
(mean = 36.65)

Std. Error

t-value

p-value

8.46

3.55

2.39

0.02

9.08

3.41

2.66

<0.01

6.06

3.48

1.74

0.08

0.68

3.72

0.18

0.85

Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item
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Table 9 (continued)
Panel H: Control Condition Paired Comparisons on Importance Weighting to Notes to the
Financial Statements
Mean
Difference
Control Condition
(mean = 34.60)
versus:
Condition A
(mean = 25.70)
Condition B
(mean = 23.74)
Condition C
(mean = 27.26)
Condition D
(mean = 35.15)

Std. Error

t-value

p-value

8.90

3.29

2.70

< 0.01

10.86

3.17

3.43

< 0.001

7.35

3.23

2.28

0.02

-0.54

3.46

-0.16

0.88

Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item

Panel I: Control Condition Paired Comparisons on Importance Weighting to Audit Reports
Mean
Difference
Control Condition
(mean = 29.43)
versus:
Condition A
(mean = 29.88)
Condition B
(mean = 31.22)
Condition C
(mean = 30.72)
Condition D
(mean = 28.21)

Std. Error

t-value

p-value

0.44

3.27

0.14

0.89

1.78

3.15

0.57

0.57

1.29

3.21

0.40

0.69

-1.23

3.43

-0.36

0.72

Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item

4.5.6 Perceptions of CAM Recurrence
To assess perceptions of the likelihood that the recurring and transient CAM would be
reported in the future, I asked participants to indicate on an 11-point Likert scale, ranging from “0
– Not at all likely” to “10 – Extremely likely”, the likelihood that a revenue-related CAM (i.e.,
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recurring CAM) and tax-related CAM (i.e., transient CAM) would be reported in future audit
reports. Table 10, Panels A and B, presents descriptive results for Perceptions of CAM Recurrence
by CAM type.
Table 10, Panel C, present the results of a two-way MANOVA with CAM disclosure
pattern (pattern) and reporting treatment as the independent variables and Perceptions of CAM
Recurrence for the revenue-related CAM and the tax-related CAM as the dependent variables.
Overall, the results show insignificant individual and joint effects of CAM disclosure pattern and
reporting treatment on Perceptions of CAM Recurrence for either CAM type. However, a paired
samples test reveals that participants perceived a higher likelihood that a revenue-related CAM
would be reported in future audit reports than a tax-related CAM in all but one of the main
conditions (see Table 10, Panel C). This finding suggests that participants were cognizant of the
transitory (i.e., intermittent) nature of the tax-related issue compared to the revenue-related issue.
Interestingly, absent any CAMs (i.e., control condition), participants rated the likelihood
of a revenue-related issue being reported as a CAM in future audit reports significantly lower than
the likelihood of a tax-related issue being reported (mean difference -0.79; p = 0.05). Recall that
in the no CAM condition, the audit report must still explicitly state the absence of any CAMs.
Moreover, the control condition reflected the same financial information and notes to the financial
statements as the disclosed item condition. Overall, this finding suggests that in the context of my
study, participants did not consider revenue recognition to be an issue that would arise in future
audit reports unless the auditor reported it as a recurring CAM. Furthermore, participants assessing
the likelihood of a tax-related issue being reported as a CAM in future audit reports as higher than
the likelihood of a revenue-related issue is reasonable given that the footnote related to the tax
issue discussed a significant unresolved tax issue.
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I also conduct paired comparisons of the control condition versus each experimental
condition (see Table 10, Panels D and E). Not surprisingly, the paired comparisons reveal that
participants assessed the likelihood of a revenue-related issue being reported as a CAM in future
audit reports as higher when a recurring revenue-related CAM is reported than when no CAMs are
reported in the audit report (all paired comparisons in Panel D significant at p-value < 0.001).
Regarding the tax-related issue, I find no significant differences between three of the four primary
experimental conditions and the control condition. However, participants’ assessment of the
likelihood that a tax-related issue will be reported as a CAM in future audit reports was
significantly higher in the mixed CAM disclosure pattern/recognized item condition than the
control condition. These paired comparisons coupled with the paired samples tests discussed
earlier support the notion that CAM disclosure patterns possess a signaling effect, especially the
mixed CAM disclosure pattern, which can influence investors’ assessments of the items
highlighted as CAMs.
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Table 10: Effect of CAM Disclosure Pattern and Reporting Treatment on
Perceptions of CAM Recurrence
Panel A: Descriptive Results for Perceptions of CAM Recurrence (Revenue-related CAM)
Reporting Treatment

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

Column Means

CAM Disclosure Pattern
Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

6.88
(2.75)
n = 40

6.65
(2.58)
n = 46

6.76
(2.65)
n = 86

5.91
(2.54)
n = 43

6.88
(2.50)
n = 34

6.37
(2.67)
n = 83

6.75
(2.53)
n = 80

6.34
(2.55)
n = 77
Grand Means
6.56
(2.60)
n = 163
3.98
(3.24)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Participants’ judgment about the likelihood that a revenue-related critical audit matter will be reported in the
auditor’s report in the future. Participants’ assessment was captured on an 11-point Likert scale, ranging from “0 –
Not at all likely” to “10 – Extremely likely”.
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Table 10 (continued)
Panel B: Descriptive Results for Perceptions of CAM Recurrence (Tax-related CAM)
Reporting Treatment

CAM Disclosure Pattern

Recognized Item

Disclosed Item

Column Means

Recurring

Mixed

Row Means

5.38
(2.53)
n = 40

5.93
(2.02)
n = 46

5.67
(2.27)
n = 86

5.49
(2.28)
n = 43

5.68
(2.42)
n = 34

5.43
(2.39)
n = 83

5.82
(2.19)
n = 80

5.57
(2.33)
n = 77
Grand Means
5.63
(2.29)
n = 163
4.77
(3.22)
n = 53

Control Condition

Notes: Participants’ judgment about the likelihood that a tax-related critical audit matter will be reported in the
auditor’s report in the future. Participants’ assessment was captured on an 11-point Likert scale, ranging from “0 –
Not at all likely” to “10 – Extremely likely”.

Panel C: Paired Samples Test of Perceptions of CAM Recurrence for Revenue-related CAM
versus Tax-Related CAM by condition
Condition A (6.88 versus 5.38)

Mean Difference
1.50

Std. Error
0.51

t-value
2.96

p-value
< 0.01

Condition B (6.65 versus 5.93)

0.72

0.38

2.07

0.05

Condition C (5.91 versus 5.49)

0.42

0.44

0.94

0.35

Condition D (6.88 versus 5.68)

1.21

3.23

0.55

0.04

-0.79

0.39

-2.04

0.05

Control Condition (3.98 versus 4.77)

Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item
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Table 10 (continued)
Panel D: Control Condition Paired Comparisons on Perceptions of CAM Recurrence for
revenue-related CAM
Mean
Difference

Std. Error

t-value

p-value

2.89

0.58

4.99

< 0.001

2.67

0.56

4.79

< 0.001

1.93

0.57

3.39

< 0.001

2.90

0.61

4.77

< 0.001

Control Condition
(mean = 3.98)
versus:
Condition A
(mean = 6.88)
Condition B
(mean = 6.65)
Condition C
(mean = 5.91)
Condition D
(mean = 6.88)

Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item

Panel E: Control Condition Paired Comparisons on Perceptions of CAM Recurrence for taxrelated CAM
Mean
Difference

Std. Error

t-value

p-value

0.60

0.54

1.12

0.26

1.16

0.52

2.25

0.03

0.71

0.53

1.36

0.18

0.90

0.56

1.61

0.11

Control Condition
(mean = 4.77)
versus:
Condition A
(mean = 5.38)
Condition B
(mean = 5.93)
Condition C
(mean = 5.49)
Condition D
(mean = 5.68)

Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item

4.5.7 Supplemental Condition
To better understand the differential impact that CAM disclosure patterns have on
investors’ judgments and decisions under distinct reporting treatments (i.e., recognized versus
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disclosed), I include a control condition (i.e., no CAM disclosure/disclosed tax issue) and compare
it to each of the main experimental conditions. Table 11, Panel A, provides descriptive statistics
by condition for each of the dependent variables.
Table 11, Panels B through E, present the results of paired comparisons for each of the
main dependent variables (i.e., Perceived Audit Quality, Perceived Financial Reporting Quality,
Perceived Risk, and Investment Decision). The results indicate a marginally significant mean
difference, such that participants Perceptions of Audit Quality were greater in the recurring CAM
pattern/recognized item condition than the control condition (Mean Difference = 0.56, one-tailed
p = 0.07). For Perceived Financial Reporting Quality, participants perceived lower financial
reporting quality in the following conditions as compared to the control condition: mixed CAM
pattern/recognized item condition (Mean Difference = -0.99, one-tailed p = 0.02), recurring CAM
pattern/disclosed item (Mean Difference = -0.90, one-tailed p = 0.035), and mixed CAM
pattern/disclosed item condition (Mean Difference = -1.04, one-tailed p = 0.025). For Perceived
Risk, the results show a marginally significant mean difference between the control condition and
the recurring CAM pattern/recognized item condition and a significant difference between the
control condition and the mixed CAM pattern/disclosed item condition. Specifically, participants
perceived less risk in the recurring CAM patter/recognized item (Mean Difference = -0.83, onetailed p = 0.06), but higher risk in the mixed CAM pattern/disclosed item condition (Mean
Difference = 1.16, one-tailed p = 0.02) as compared to the control condition. Lastly, for Investment
Decision, results indicate that participants invested a larger amount of money in the recurring CAM
pattern/recognized condition (Mean Difference = 976.89, one-tailed p = 0.03), but a smaller
amount of money in the mixed CAM pattern/disclosed item condition (Mean Difference = -904.00,
one-tailed p = 0.045).
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Collectively, the results suggest that CAM disclosure patterns differentially influence the
way investors perceive disclosed versus recognized items. For instance, Perceived Financial
Reporting Quality is lower when either a recurring or mixed CAM disclosure pattern and a
disclosed item is present, compared to when there are no CAMs, and a disclosed item is reported,
suggesting that the mere presence of CAM disclosures decreases investors’ Perceptions of
Financial Reporting Quality when an item is disclosed. Furthermore, the results suggest that
investors’ Perceived Risk is significantly higher. Thus, Investment Decision is significantly lower
than the control condition when a CAM disclosure related to the disclosed item is present,
suggesting that non-recurring CAMs have a risk-signaling effect, especially for disclosed items.
Conversely, for Perceived Risk and Investment Decision, recurring CAM patterns and recognized
items are perceived more favorably (i.e., lower risk and higher investment amounts) than the
control condition with no CAMs and a disclosed item. Together, these results suggest that certain
CAM disclosure patterns can either enhance or diminish investors’ risk perceptions in the presence
of disclosed or recognized items, ultimately influencing the amount they invest in a company.
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Table 11: Comparison of Control Condition versus Experimental Conditions for
Perceptions of Audit Quality, Financial Reporting Quality, Risk, and Investment Decision.
Panel A: Descriptive Results by Condition for Each Dependent Variable
Conditions

Dependent Variables
Perceived Audit
Quality

Perceived Financial
Reporting Quality

Perceived
Risk

Investment
Decision ($)

A (n = 40)

8.50
(1.38)

7.03
(2.48)

3.45
(2.31)

4,675.00
(2,017.71)

B (n = 46)

8.04
(1.78)

6.52
(2.47)

4.54
(2.58)

3,630.43
(2,132.90)

C (n = 43)

8.19
(1.50)

6.60
(1.94)

4.56
(2.12)

3,418.60
(2,574.90)

D (n = 34)

8.03
(1.66)

6.47
(2.22)

5.44
(2.67)

2,794.12
(2,345.59)

7.94
(2.23)

7.51
(2.69)

4.28
(3.00)

3,698.11
(2,839.18)

Control
Condition
(n = 53)

Notes: Participants rated Perceived Audit Quality by indicating their level of agreement with the following statement:
The audit of FHC Corporation was performed thoroughly. Participant’s level of agreement was captured using an 11point Likert scale anchored at 0 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “Neither agree nor disagree,” and 10 = “Strongly agree.”
Participants rated Perceived Financial Reporting Quality by indicating their level of agreement with the following
statement: FHC Corporation's financial reports did NOT contain errors. Participant’s level of agreement was captured
using an 11-point Likert scale anchored at 0 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “Neither agree nor disagree,” and 10 =
“Strongly agree.”
Participants rated Perceived Risk by indicating their level of agreement with the following statement: An investment
in FHC Corporation is a risky investment. Participant’s level of agreement was captured using an 11-point Likert scale
anchored at 0 = “Strongly disagree,” 5 = “Neither agree nor disagree,” and 10 = “Strongly agree.”
Participants indicated their Investment Decision by indicating how much they would invest in FHC Corporation,
assuming they had $10,000 to invest. Participants’ investment amount was captured using an 11-point Likert scale
anchored at $0 = “None of it,” $5,000 = “Some of it,” and $10,000 = “All of it.”
Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item;
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item
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Table 11 (continued)
Panel B: Control Condition Paired Comparisons for Perceived Audit Quality

Control Condition
(mean = 7.94)
versus:
Condition A
(mean = 8.50)
Condition B
(mean = 8.04)
Condition C
(mean = 8.19)
Condition D
(mean = 8.03)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error

t-value

p-value

0.56

0.37

1.50

0.07a

0.10

0.36

0.28

0.78

0.24

0.36

0.67

0.51

0.09

0.39

0.22

0.83

Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item
a

one-tailed p-value

Panel C: Control Condition Paired Comparisons for Perceived Financial Reporting Quality

Control Condition
(mean = 7.51)
versus:
Condition A
(mean = 7.03)
Condition B
(mean = 6.52)
Condition C
(mean = 6.60)
Condition D
(mean = 6.47)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error

t-value

p-value

-0.48

0.50

-0.97

0.34

-0.99

0.48

-2.05

0.02a

-0.90

0.49

-1.84

0.04a

-1.04

0.53

-1.97

0.03a

Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item
a

one-tailed p-value
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Table 11 (continued)
Panel D: Control Condition Paired Comparisons for Perceived Risk
Mean
Difference

Std. Error

t-value

p-value

-0.83

0.54

-1.55

0.06a

0.26

0.52

0.50

0.62

0.28

0.53

0.52

0.60

1.16

0.57

2.05

0.02a

Control Condition
(mean = 4.28)
versus:
Condition A
(mean = 3.45)
Condition B
(mean = 4.54)
Condition C
(mean = 4.56)
Condition D
(mean = 5.44)

Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item
a

one-tailed p-value

Panel E: Control Condition Paired Comparisons for Investment Decision
Control Condition
(mean = 3,698.11) versus:
Condition A
(mean = 4,675.00)
Condition B
(mean = 3,630.43)
Condition C
(mean = 3,418.60)
Condition D
(mean = 2,794.12)

Mean Difference

Std. Error

t-value

p-value

976.89

503.86

1.92

0.03a

-67.68

500.99

-0.14

0.89

-279.51

553.43

-0.56

0.58

-904.00

560.28

-1.70

0.05a

Conditions:
A: Recurring CAM pattern / Recognized Item; B: Mixed CAM pattern / Recognized Item
C: Recurring CAM pattern / Disclosed Item; D: Mixed CAM pattern / Disclosed Item
a

one-tailed p-value

4.6 Summary of Results
Table 12 provides a summary of the results. Consistent with processing fluency, the results
suggest that investors intuitively encode the frequency in which CAM disclosures are reported.
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Furthermore, the results indicate that investors process recurring versus mixed CAM disclosure
patterns differently and that some of their judgments and decisions are influenced by the disclosure
patterns that emerge over time. Specifically, I find that investors exhibit higher Perceptions of Risk
and adjust their Investment Decision accordingly when exposed to a mixed CAM disclosure pattern
instead of a recurring CAM disclosure pattern (H1a and H1b supported). Furthermore, the results
of my study suggest that mixed CAM disclosure patterns are more risk-signaling than recurring
CAM disclosure patterns and lead to less favorable investment decisions, especially when a
disclosed item is reported (H2a and H2b supported). However, I do not find that CAM disclosure
patterns influence investors’ perceptions of either audit quality or financial reporting quality
(RQ1).
To investigate the theoretical arguments presented in the paper, I analyze participants’
attention to CAMs over time. As evidenced by participants’ steady decrease in attention over time,
my results suggest that investors experience processing fluency when exposed to a recurring CAM
disclosure pattern. In other words, investors pay less and less attention to a CAM over time when
the same CAM recurs over time. Conversely, when exposed to a mixed CAM disclosure pattern,
investors' attentional decrease towards the recurring CAM is halted when a new CAM emerges. In
other words, introducing a new CAM encourages investors to pay as much attention to the
recurring CAM as they did in a prior year. A potential explanation for this finding is that investors
may revisit an “old” CAM to understand why it is recurring upon realizing that CAMs can be
removed.
Lastly, I explore the mechanism through which CAM disclosure patterns and reporting
treatment influence investment decisions. I find that CAM disclosure pattern influences investment
decisions primarily through perceptions of risk. Namely, investors perceive higher risk when
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exposed to a mixed CAM pattern, leading to lower investment amounts. Conversely, reporting
treatment influences investment decisions primarily through perceptions of credibility. Consistent
with prior research suggesting that investors perceive information salience as more reliable (e.g.,
Clor-Proell et al. 2014), investors in my study perceive financial information as more credible
when an item is recognized, reducing perceived risk and leading to higher investment.
Table 12
Summary of Hypotheses Testing/Research Question Findings
Hypotheses

Result/Finding

H1a:

Investors’ perceptions of risk will be lower (higher) when exposed
to a recurring (mixed) CAM disclosure pattern.

Supported

H1b:

Investors’ investment decisions will be larger (smaller) when
exposed to a recurring (mixed) CAM disclosure pattern.

Supported

H2a:

Investors’ perceptions of risk will be lowest (highest) when
processing a recurring CAM disclosure pattern and a recognized
item (mixed CAM disclosure pattern and a disclosed item).

Supported

H2b:

Investors’ investment decision will be highest (lowest) when
processing a recurring CAM disclosure pattern and a recognized
item (mixed CAM disclosure pattern and a disclosed item).

Supported

Do CAM disclosure patterns significantly influence
RQ1: nonprofessional investors’ perceptions of audit quality and financial
reporting quality?
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No significant
difference

Chapter 5. Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to address the following research questions: (1) Does CAM
disclosure pattern influence investment-related judgments and decisions? (2) Does the reporting
treatment of a CAM-related item differentially influence investment-related judgments and
decisions under different CAM disclosure patterns?
The results of my study provide evidence that investors perceive higher risk and invest less
under a mixed CAM disclosure pattern versus a recurring CAM disclosure pattern, suggesting that
investors may perceive a mixed CAM disclosure pattern as a signal of higher uncertainty.
Conversely, investors may perceive a recurring CAM disclosure pattern as a signal of less
uncertainty. Consistent with processing fluency, my results suggest that investors process a mixed
CAM disclosure pattern less fluently than a recurring CAM disclosure pattern. Additionally, the
results show that investors perceive the highest level of risk when a mixed CAM disclosure pattern
is combined with a disclosed item and invest the least amount of money. Conversely, investors
perceive the lowest level of risk when a recurring CAM disclosure pattern is reported alongside a
recognized item, leading to the highest investment amounts. Additionally, I explore whether CAM
disclosure patterns influence investors’ judgments of audit quality or financial reporting quality
and find that CAM disclosure patterns do not influence investors’ perceptions of either. I believe
this to be particularly positive news considering that CAMs are not intended to be perceived as a
qualification of the auditor’s opinion and thus should not influence perceived quality.
Using an unobtrusive cognitive process measurement tool, I find that participants
experienced processing fluency in the recurring CAM disclosure condition as evidenced by
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participants’ steady attentional decline towards the recurring CAM. When a new CAM is
introduced, as was the case in the mixed CAM disclosure pattern condition, participants' steady
attentional decline is halted, suggesting that the recurring CAM was no longer processed fluently.
Taken together, the results of this study provide preliminary evidence of a mere exposure effect in
the context of CAM disclosure patterns. Namely, the results suggest that recurring CAM disclosure
patterns can induce unconscious repetition-based familiarity leading to processing fluency and
more favorable judgments and decisions.
A supplemental path analysis reveals that CAM disclosure patterns primarily influence
investment decisions through perceptions of risk, whereas reporting treatment primarily influences
investment decisions through perceived credibility (i.e., the extent to which investors believe that
the information they reviewed presents complete and full disclosures). In other words, investors
negatively adjust their investment decision according to the perceived level of risk for a given
company, and mixed CAM disclosure patterns lead to higher perceived risk without influencing
the perceived credibility of the financial information. Regarding reporting treatment, a disclosed
item increases investors’ perceptions of risk and lowers the amount they are willing to invest in a
company because they feel that the financial information is less credible.
Overall, the results suggest that companies receiving the same CAM disclosure over time
are perceived more favorably by investors than companies that do not receive the same CAM
disclosure over time. Further, the results of my study suggest that reporting a transient CAM can
have long-term unintended consequences, as investors associate mixed CAM disclosure patterns
with higher risk and are less willing to invest even when the transient CAM is no longer reported.
The unintended consequence of a mixed CAM disclosure pattern is particularly more acute with a
disclosed item than a recognized item. One way to lessen the negative effect of a mixed CAM
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pattern is to recognize the CAM-related item. Lastly, the results of my study suggest that auditors
and auditees should continue to engage in CAM-related discussions, particularly when transient
CAMs relate to a disclosed amount.
The results of this study contribute in several ways. From an accounting literature
perspective, my study provides evidence on the effects of disclosure characteristics on investors’
information processing and decisions in a CAM setting. Thus, the results of my study add to the
body of knowledge in a scarcely-researched area (Bonner 2008; Brown et al. 2020; Hamilton and
Winchel 2019). My study is also the first, to my knowledge, to ever have utilized an eye-tracking
alternative such as Hotjar. Implementing this innovative technology in accounting studies provides
richer insights into decision processes that are challenging to capture with other methods. Second,
the results of my study provide standard-setters with valuable information that can be used in their
post-implementation review and in their consideration of any possible standard revisions. For
instance, regulators and standard-setters could further evaluate and discuss whether the unintended
impact of CAM disclosure patterns on investors’ perceptions fairly represents the standard's
intended benefits. Lastly, the results of my study can also be informative to audit practitioners.
Given that the results of this study suggest that investors pay less and less attention over time to a
recurring CAM, audit firms might want to consider ways to highlight significant changes within a
recurring CAM disclosure so that investors do not inadvertently skip over said changes.
Additionally, auditors may want to engage in richer discussions with management and those
charged with governance, especially when a CAM relates to a disclosed item.
This study is subject to certain limitations that may provide opportunities for future
research. For example, the effects captured by this study may be attributable to the quantity of
CAMs as opposed to the repetition or novelty of CAMs. In this study, I attempt to test the effects
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of CAM disclosure patterns on investors’ information processing by exposing participants to either
a recurring CAM disclosure pattern (i.e., one where the same CAM recurs over time) or a mixed
CAM disclosure pattern (i.e., one where a transient CAM is introduced alongside a recurring
CAM). This design choice was intentional as having multiple new CAMs discontinue would be
highly unlikely. Anecdotally, audit practitioners suggest that CAMs will likely be repeated,
although some issues will require a transient CAM (i.e., a new CAM that discontinues).
Furthermore, a recent post-implementation review conducted by the PCAOB shows that, on
average, Big Four audit firms report 1.7 CAMs per audit engagement (PCAOB 2020). Thus,
including more CAMs in my experiment would have created unnecessary information overload.
I also acknowledge that the revenue-related CAM contained slightly more words than the
tax-related CAM (397 words versus 308 words, respectively) which may implicitly signal that one
CAM is riskier (i.e., “more critical”) than the other. While my design choice increases external
validity, it introduces the possibility that a confounding factor drives my results. As with any
experiment, there is often a trade-off between internal and external validity. However, I believe
this limitation to bias against findings and thus opted to leave these CAMs unequal.
Another limitation relates to the nature of the CAMs used in my experiment. For example,
revenue may be perceived as being more generic than a tax-related CAM. Future research may
want to explore whether the effects of repetition vary across different types of recurring CAMs
(e.g., systemic versus episodic CAMs), or whether the explicit labeling of CAMs as either systemic
(i.e., account or disclosure will likely permanently be reported as a CAM) or episodic (i.e., account
or disclosure will likely not be permanently reported as a CAM) leads to greater informativeness.
Furthermore, future research may also engage in a deeper exploration of investors’ perceived
degree of uncertainty related to CAM-related issues.
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I also acknowledge that presenting three audit reports consecutively without a distractor
task after each audit report may have heightened the salience of the CAM disclosure pattern
manipulation. However, I do not believe that a distractor task was necessary for my setting because
participants were not asked to provide judgments and decisions after reviewing each audit report.
Instead, participants were asked to provide the answers to my variables of interest after reviewing
all three audit reports and the comparative financial statements. Given the recency of the standard,
investors currently cannot view three expanded audit reports sequentially. However, investors will
soon be able to do so once more expanded audit reports become available.
Lastly, my study investigates the effects of CAM disclosure patterns on nonprofessional
investors’ information processing and investment-related judgments and decisions. Prior research
suggests that professional investors are experts in gathering and processing information (Bartov,
Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky 2000) and exhibit less bias in their judgments and decision-making
(Hamilton and Winchel 2019). As such, professional investors may attend and react differently to
CAM disclosure patterns than nonprofessional investors.
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Appendix A: Evidence on CAM Disclosure Type
Table A1
CAM Disclosures Reported for Fortune 100 Companies

Company1

Disclosed Critical Audit Matter2

Valuation a

Recognized
Amount b

Disclosure c





1 Walmart
Contingencies
Valuation of Indefinite-Lived Intangible Assets



2 Amazon.com


Uncertain Tax Positions
3 Exxon Mobil


Net PP&E
4 Apple



Uncertain Tax Positions
5 CVS Health
Goodwill
Valuation of Health Care Costs Payable



Goodwill and Indefinite-Lived Intangible Assets
Unpaid Losses and Loss Adjustment Expenses
Unpaid Losses and Loss Adjustment Expenses Under
Retroactive Reinsurance Contracts




Goodwill
Incurred but not Reported (IBNR) Claim Liability





6 Berkshire Hathaway



7 UnitedHealth Group


8 McKesson
Contingent Liabilities
Goodwill
Tax-free Separation of Change Healthcare JV
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ITrelated d

Table 1A (Continued)
9 AT&T
Discount rates used in determining pension and postretirement
benefit obligations
Uncertain Tax Positions




10 AmerisourceBergen


Contingent Liabilities
Goodwill
Long-lived asset impairment




11 Alphabet


Loss Contingencies



12 Ford Motor
Consumer Collective Allowance for Credit Losses
Defined Benefit Pension Plan Obligations and Benefit Cost
Warranty and Field Service Actions Accrual (United States)




Goodwill Impairment Assessment
Valuation of Long-term Disability Disabled Life Reserves




Evaluation of self-insurance liabilities
Evaluation of the impact of the 2017 Tax Act
Performance of incremental audit procedures over IT financial
reporting processes





13 Cigna

14 Costco Wholesale



15 Chevron
The Impact of Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves and Other
Factors on Upstream Property, Plant, and Equipment, Net
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Table 1A (Continued)
16 Cardinal Health


Medical Unit Goodwill
Product Liability Lawsuits
Uncertain Tax Positions




17 JPMorgan Chase
Allowance for Loan Losses - Wholesale Loan, Credit Card
Loan and Consumer Loan Portfolios
Fair Value of Certain Level 3 Financial Instruments
Fair Value of Mortgage Servicing Rights Assets





18 General Motors
Product warranty and recall campaigns
Sales incentives
Valuation of GM Financial Equipment on Operating Leases





Walgreens Boots
19 Alliance
Goodwill and Indefinite-Lived Intangible Assets Impairment
Evaluation – Boots Reporting Unit and Boots Indefinite-lived
Intangible Assets
Uncertain Tax Positions




Verizon
20 Communications
Impairment Evaluation for Wireline Goodwill
Income Taxes – Benefit from the disposition of stock of a
foreign affiliate
Valuation of Employee Benefit Obligations





21 Microsoft



Revenue Recognition
Uncertain Tax Positions
22 Marathon Petroleum


Goodwill Impairment Tests
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Table 1A (Continued)
23 Kroger
Goodwill Impairment Assessment



Allowance for Loan Losses
New Accounting Guidance - Financial Instruments




Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses
Valuation of Certain Level 3 Financial Instruments




Evaluation of the self-insurance liability
Evaluation of gross unrecognized income tax benefits



Impairment review of equity method investments



Acquisition of Sky Limited
Film and Television Costs



24 Fannie Mae




25 Bank of America

26 Home Depot


27 Phillips 66
28 Comcast



29 Anthem


Valuation of Incurred but Not Paid Claims
Revenue Recognition for New Pharmacy Benefits Manager
Business



30 Wells Fargo
Assessment of the allowance for credit losses
Assessment of the residential mortgage servicing rights (MSRs)




31 Citigroup
Assessment of the fair value of hard-to-price financial
instruments
Assessment of the allowance for loan losses collectively
evaluated for impairment
Assessment of the realizability of deferred tax assets,
specifically as it relates to foreign tax credits
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Table 1A (Continued)
32 Valero Energy


Assessment of gross unrecognized tax benefits
33 General Electric
Evaluation of revenue recognition on certain long-term service
agreements
Evaluation of premium deficiency testing to assess the
adequacy of future policy benefit reserves




Evaluation of projected revenue and operating profit used in the
assessment of the carrying value of goodwill in the Grid
Solutions equipment and services and Hydro reporting units
Evaluation of the effects of particular tax positions




34 Dell Technologies
Revenue Recognition - Identification of Performance
Obligations in Revenue Contracts
Goodwill and Indefinite-lived Trade Names Impairment
Assessments
Intra-entity Transfer of Intellectual Property Rights





35 Johnson & Johnson


U.S. Pharmaceutical Rebate Reserves
Litigation Contingencies
Litigation




36 State Farm Insurance
N/A
37 Target
Valuation of Inventory and related Cost of Sales
Valuation of Vendor Income Receivables




Acquisition of Red Hat, Inc.—Valuation of Intangible Assets
Acquired
Income Taxes—Uncertain Tax Positions



38 IBM
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Table 1A (Continued)
39 Raytheon Technologies
Revenue Recognition - Contract Estimates at Completion
Pensions - Long-term Return on Plan Assets and Discount Rate
Assumptions




40 Boeing




Cost Estimates for Fixed-Price Development Contracts
ProgramAccounting Estimates for New Programs
Liabilities related to the 737 MAX Grounding
41 Freddie Mac
Single-Family Allowance for Loan Losses



42 Centene


Evaluation of the estimated medical claims liability
Evaluation of the estimated Affordable Care Act risk
adjustment accruals



43 United Parcel Service
Central States Pension Fund coordinating benefit obligation
assumptions
Valuation of U.S. hedge fund, risk parity, private debt, private
equity and real estate investments
Revenue





44 Lowe's


Merchandise Inventory - Vendor Funds
45 Intel


Inventory Valuation
46 Facebook
Loss Contingencies
Uncertain Tax Positions




Pension Projected Benefit Obligation
Valuation of Self-Insurance Accruals



47 FedEx

98





Table 1A (Continued)
48 MetLife
Fair Value of Level 3 Fixed Maturity Securities Determined
Using Internal Matrix Pricing or Discounted Cash Flow
Techniques
Valuation of Future Policy Benefits for Long-Term Care
Insurance
Valuation of Embedded Derivative Liabilities





49 Walt Disney
Acquisition of TFCF Corporation - Valuation of Intangible
Assets and Film and Television Costs
Acquisition of TFCF Corporation - Unrecognized Tax Benefits




50 Procter & Gamble
Goodwill and Intangible Assets - Shave Care Goodwill and
Gillette Indefinite Lived Intangible Asset
Acquisition of the over the counter healthcare business of
Merck KGaA




51 Pepsico Inc
Assessment of the carrying value of certain reacquired and
acquired franchise rights and certain juice and dairy brands
Evaluation of certain sales incentive accruals
Evaluation of unrecognized tax benefits





52 Humana Inc
Goodwill Impairment Assessment - Provider and Clinical
Reporting Units
Valuation of Incurred but not yet Reported Benefits Payable
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Table 1A (Continued)
53 Prudential PLC
Valuation of guaranteed benefit features associated with certain
life and annuity products included in the liability for future
policy benefits
Valuation of the deferred acquisition costs related to universal
life and variable life products and fixed and variable deferred
annuity products and deferred sales inducements related to
fixed and variable deferred annuity products
Valuation of the liability for future policy benefits for
individual and group long-term care policies
Contingent payments related to the acquisition of Assurance IQ











Archer-Daniels-Midland
54 Co
Fair Value Basis Adjustments - Inventories Carried at Market
and Forward Commodity Contracts
Valuation of Acquired Intangible Assets of Neovia S.A.S.
(Neovia)




55 Albertsons
N/A
56 SYSCO Corp
Valuation of Goodwill/Impairment Amount
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts






57 Lockheed Martin Corp
Defined Benefit Pension Plan Obligation
Goodwill and Indefinite-Lived Intangible Asset Impairment
Assessments - Sikorsky Reporting Unit and Trademark
Revenue recognition based on the percentage of completion
method





58 HP Inc



Revenue Recognition
Income Taxes
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Table 1A (Continued)
59 Energy Transfer LP
Goodwill Impairment Assessment
Environmental Remediation
SemGroup Acquisition



Valuation of Certain Level 3 Financial Instruments
Provision for Losses That May Arise from Litigation and
Regulatory Proceedings related to 1Malaysia Development
Berhad






Goldman Sachs Group
60 Inc



61 Morgan Stanley
Valuation of Level 3 Financial Assets and Liabilities Carried at
Fair Value



62 Caterpillar Inc


Uncertain Tax Position - Caterpillar SARL IRS Examination
63 CISCO Systems Inc
Revenue recognition — identification of contractual terms in
certain customer arrangements



Evaluation of certain assumptions impacting the U.S. Medicare,
Medicaid, and performance-based contract rebates accrual
Evaluation of gross unrecognized tax benefits
Evaluation of product and other product-related litigation





64 Pfizer Inc

65 HCA Healthcare, Inc.


Revenue Recognition
Professional Liability Claims
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Table 1A (Continued)
American International
66 Group Inc
Amortization and Recoverability of Deferred Policy
Acquisition Costs for Investment-Oriented Products
Recoverability of Net U.S. Federal Deferred Tax Asset
Valuation of Certain Level 3 Fixed Maturity Securities
Valuation of Guaranteed Benefit Features of Certain Life and
Annuity Products
Valuation of Insurance Liabilities - Unpaid Losses and Loss
Adjustment Expenses (Loss Reserves)






67 American Express Co
Membership Rewards Liability - Ultimate Redemption Rate
Reserves for Losses on Card Member Loans - Qualitative
Reserve Component



Employee Benefit Plans
Loyalty Program - American Express Contract Brand Value
Loyalty Program - Mileage Breakage





68 Delta Air Lines Inc



69 Merck & Co., Inc.
Customer Discount Accruals in the U.S. - Medicaid, Managed
Care and Medicare Part D Rebates



Assessment of the estimated selling price for mileage credits
earned through travel
Evaluation of estimated passenger travel revenue




Evaluation of capitalization of installation direct labor and
overhead costs



American Airlines
70 Group Inc.

Charter
71 Communications, Inc
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Table 1A (Continued)
72 Allstate Corp
Premium Deficiency Reserve for Life-Contingent Immediate
Annuities
Reserve for Property and Casualty Insurance Claims and
Claims Expense




73 New York Life Insurance
N/A
74 Nationwide
N/A
75 Best Buy Co Inc
Goodwill — Best Buy Health Reporting Unit
Vendor Allowances



BRW Term Loan Impairment Analysis
Frequent Flyer Deferred Revenue Estimate of Miles not
Expected to be Redeemed
Indefinite-lived Intangible Assets (Route Authorities)
Impairment Analysis





United Airlines Holdings,
76 Inc.






Liberty Mutual
77 Insurance Group
N/A
78 Dow Inc


Goodwill - Coatings & Performance Monomers Reporting Unit
Other-Than-Temporary-Impairment (“OTTI”) of the Sadara
Chemical Company (“Sadara”) equity method investment



79 Tyson Foods Inc
Acquisition of Keystone Foods - Valuation of Acquired
Customer Relationships
Indefinite Life Intangible Assets Quantitative Impairment
Assessments
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Table 1A (Continued)
80 TJX Companies Inc


Adoption of the Leases Accounting Standard
81 TIAA
N/A
82 Oracle Corp



Legal Contingencies
83 General Dynamics Corp
Evaluation over the Estimation of Costs to Complete on Select
Long-term Contracts in the Defense Segments
Evaluation over the Measurement of the Pension Projected
Benefit Obligation




84 Deere & Co


Sales incentives
Allowance for Credit Losses



85 Nike Inc


Accounting for Income Taxes
86 Progressive Corp
Valuation of Loss and Loss Adjustment Expense Reserves



87 Publix Super Markets
N/A
88 Coca-Cola Company
Accounting for uncertain tax positions
Valuation of trademarks with indefinite lives and goodwill




Massachusetts Mutual
89 Life Insurance
N/A
90 Tech Data Corp
Accounting for Income Taxes
Valuation of customer and vendor relationships intangible asset
in the DLT Solutions LLC acquisition
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Table 1A (Continued)
World Fuel Services
91 Corp
92

93

94
95

96

97

Goodwill Impairment Assessment - Land Reporting Unit

Honeywell International Inc
Asbestos Related Liabilities - North American Refractories
Company (NARCO) Trust Liability
Revenue Recognition and Contracts with Customers - Long-Term
Fixed Price Contracts (Performance Materials and Technologies
(PMT))
ConocoPhillips
Accounting for asset retirement obligations for certain offshore
properties
Depreciation, depletion and amortization of proved oil and gas
properties
USAA
N/A
Exelon Corp
Accounting for the Effects of Rate Regulation
Annual Nuclear Decommissioning Asset Retirement Obligations
(ARO) Assessment
Impairment Assessment of Long-Lived Generation Assets
Level 3 Derivatives Significant Assumptions
Northrop Grumman Corp
Income Taxes - Uncertain Tax Positions
Revenue Recognition - Cost and Revenue Estimates for
Development Contracts
Capital One Financial Corp
Goodwill Impairment Assessment
Allowance for loan and lease losses - Credit Card and Consumer
Banking
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Table 1A (Continued)
98 Plains GP Holdings LP
Fair Value of Investment in Capline LLC
Goodwill Impairment Assessment — Facilities and Supply and
Logistics Segments




99 AbbVie Inc.
Sales rebate accruals for Medicaid, Medicare and managed care
programs
Valuation of contingent consideration
100




StoneX Group
N/A

1

Companies shown on table are the first 100 companies from the latest Fortune 500 list published by Forbes.
Complete listing can be found at: https://fortune.com/fortune500/

2

Disclosed critical audit matters were evaluated for each company by examining the company's 2019 annual report.

a

The valuation category refers to CAMs that relate to challenging, subjective, or complex judgment in auditing the assumptions or valuation models of
an overall account balance .

b

The recognized amount category refers to CAMs that relate to challenging, subjective, or complex judgment in auditing amounts recognized during the
year.

c

The disclosure category refers to CAMs that relate to challenging, subjective, or complex judgment in auditing disclosed but not recognized amounts
during the year.

d

The IT-related category refers to CAMs that relate to challenging, subjective, or complex matters in auditing IT systems producing financial
information.
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Appendix B: Experimental Conditions
Table A2
Overview of Experimental Conditions
Experimental Condition

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Revenue-related CAM

Revenue-related CAM
+
Recognized tax issue

Revenue-related CAM

Revenue-related CAM

A

Recurring CAM pattern /
Recognized Tax Issue

B

Mixed CAM pattern /
Recognized Tax Issue

Revenue-related CAM

Revenue-related CAM
& Tax-related CAM
+
Recognized tax issue

C

Recurring CAM pattern /
Disclosed Tax Issue

Revenue-related CAM

Revenue-related CAM
+
Disclosed tax issue

Revenue-related CAM

D

Mixed CAM pattern /
Disclosed Tax Issue

Revenue-related CAM

Revenue-related CAM
& Tax-related CAM
+
Disclosed tax issue

Revenue-related CAM
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Appendix C: Experimental Instrument

<<<page break>>>
Figure A1 – Experimental Instrument
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<<<page break>>>
Figure A1 – Experimental Instrument (Continued)
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<<<page break>>>
Figure A1 – Experimental Instrument (Continued)
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Figure A2 – CAM Disclosure Summary – Recurring CAM Disclosure Pattern

<<<page break>>>
*Consistent with prior research (e.g., Vinson et al. 2019), I included the following information to
summarize CAM disclosures over time to avoid imposing unnecessary burden on participants’
time.
Figure A3 – CAM Disclosure Summary – Mixed CAM Disclosure Pattern
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<<<page break>>>
Figure A4 – Transition To and From Investor Relations Site
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<<<page break>>>
Figure A5 – Case Questions
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Figure A6 – Manipulation Check Questions
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Figure A7 – Wrap-up Questions
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<<<page break>>>
Figure A7 – Wrap-up Questions (Continued)
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Figure A8 – Background Questions

117

<<<end of survey>>>
Figure A8 – Background Questions (Continued)
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Appendix D: Experimental Manipulations (excerpted from Investor Relations Site)

Figure A9 – Revenue Recognition CAM (i.e., Recurring CAM)
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Figure A10 – Tax-related CAM (i.e., Transient CAM)
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Figure A11 – Disclosed Tax Issue & Related Footnote
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Figure A12 – Recognized Tax Issue & Related Footnote
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Appendix E: IRB Letter

Figure A13 – IRB Letter
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Figure A13 – IRB Letter (Continued)
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